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CRIMINALIZING STATEMENTS OF
TERRORIST INTENT: HOW TO
UNDERSTAND THE LAW GOVERNING
TERRORIST THREATS, AND WHY IT
SHOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF LONGTERM PREVENTIVE DETENTION
ALEC WALEN *
I. INTRODUCTION
What ought we, as a liberal society, do with members of our society
who have stated their intentions to commit terrorist attacks? Preventively
detain them to ensure that they do not have the opportunity to act on those
intentions? Monitor them with the goal of catching them, hopefully before
they do any harm, in a criminal act for which they can be prosecuted and, if
convicted, imprisoned? Or prosecute them for having stated that intention?
I argue here for the last option, which can be pursued by prosecuting them
for threatening to commit terrorist acts.1
The kind of threat with which I am concerned is not the paradigmatic
kind of threat, in which the person making the threat tries to communicate
the threat to one or more victims. 2 It is the kind of threat in which the
potential victims may never know of the threat, but others, who may feel
personally safe, have reason to believe that the person who made the threat
intends to perform the threatened action. In other words, they think he is a
threat by virtue of his making a threat.

*

Alec Walen, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden; Associate
Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick. I am indebted to Julio
Navarro for excellent research assistance.
1
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(2) makes it a crime, punishable by up to ten years
in prison, to threaten to commit an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries. 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(2) (2006).
2
See Corpus Juris Secundum on Threats, 86 C.J.S. Threats § 3 (2010). It lists, as one of
the elements of a criminal threat, “that the threat conveyed to the person threatened a gravity
of purpose and the immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” Id. In other words, a
threat paradigmatically involves a threatened person.
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This can easily be misconstrued as allowing the state to punish on the
basis of a prediction of dangerousness. It is not that. Threatening, in the
sense of stating one’s intention to commit a violent criminal act, is an
inchoate crime, 3 similar to, but more inchoate than attempt.
One might worry that prosecutions for threat would run up against the
First Amendment protection of free speech. But the doctrine of “true
threats” holds that while political hyperbole is protected speech, true threats
are not. 4 The problem in this area of constitutional law is only that the case
law discussing true threats muddles a number of important distinctions. I
will argue, however, that the doctrine can be cleaned up to show why it
does and should support prosecuting those who state their intentions to
commit terrorist (or other violent criminal) acts.
I proceed in four parts. First, in Part II, I present a hypothetical but
realistic case that illustrates the potential for this problem to arise. This
example helps illustrate the basic concerns that point in favor of the
prosecutorial option. In Part III, I summarize an argument I have made
elsewhere, that U.S. citizens should not be subjected to long-term
preventive detention, at least not now, when the police and the courts are
functioning normally. 5 In Part IV, I explain briefly why monitoring alone is
not a position that should be relied on if detention is a legitimate option.
And in Part V, I discuss the crime of making threats, including terrorist
threats. To address the incoherence in threat doctrine as it now stands, this
Part is divided into three sections. In the first, I describe the doctrine of true
threats and explain why it is incoherent. In the second, I explain how it
should be carved up into two distinct crimes: threatening a victim (a
potentially complete crime) and stating the intention to commit a crime (an
essentially inchoate crime). In the third, I defend the inchoate crime against
the objection that it takes the notion of inchoate crimes too far from
completed criminal acts.
II. ILLUSTRATING THE ADVANTAGE OF USING THREAT CRIMES
Consider this hypothetical. The CIA receives a tip from U, an
undercover agent in Pakistan, that an American citizen, A, is working with
members of al Qaeda on a plot to set off a bomb in Los Angeles. The FBI
uses that information to get a wiretap on A under the Foreign Intelligence

3

This is directly contrary to the view taken by Paul T. Crane, “True Threats” and the
Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1270 (2006).
4
This doctrine traces back to Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
5
Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention
for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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Surveillance Act (FISA). 6 They listen for a few months and note that she
has made a number of calls to people who are suspected of being al Qaeda
members in Pakistan and the U.S., but the content of the calls is not
obviously incriminating. U is consulted, and he says that discussions about
charity work in the U.S. are really coded discussions of planned attacks. In
that light, the discussions are highly incriminating. If the Government
could make the case that A has been plotting to attack Los Angeles, it could
prosecute A for conspiracy to commit terrorism. 7 Without calling U in to
testify to explain how he knows what the code is and to provide other
substantiating information, however, the recorded phone calls would not
support proof beyond a reasonable doubt that A is conspiring to commit a
terrorist act. Moreover, U cannot be brought in to testify against A without
blowing his cover, something the U.S. is currently unwilling to do. 8
The U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles has looked into prosecuting A for
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). 9 But
there is no evidence that she has provided money or services to an FTO. As
a next move, the FBI has tried to set up a sting operation, offering to help A

6

A FISA warrant can be obtained if a federal officer shows probable cause to believe
that the target is an agent of a foreign power, including organizations such as al Qaeda. 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(1)(C); 1801(c); 1805(a)(2)(A) (2006).
7
The jurisdictional bases for prosecuting for an act of terrorism transcending national
boundaries are very broad, and it would be hard to blow up a major building in a city like
Los Angeles without meeting them. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(b)(1) (2006). The same is true
for 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (concerning the use of weapons of mass destruction; also including a
threat crime). See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006).
8
A could not currently be tried by a military commission, because those are reserved for
the trial of aliens. Military Commissions Act (MCA), 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2006). But suppose
the MCA was revised to allow U.S. citizens to be tried by military commission. This
presumably could constitutionally be done, based on Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(holding that U.S. citizens who worked for an enemy nation could be tried in a military
commission for war crimes), and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en
banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.Ct. 1545 (2009) (holding
that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001), allows the President to treat al Qaeda as an enemy like equivalent to an enemy
nation). And it would help the Government bring in U’s testimony without making U
available for cross-examination. The MCA states that hearsay evidence can be introduced if
“direct testimony from the witness is not available as a practical matter, taking into
consideration the physical location of the witness, the unique circumstances of military and
intelligence operations during hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or intelligence
operations that would likely result from the production of the witness.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii)(III) (2006). But § 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii)(IV) would allow U’s testimony to
be introduced as hearsay, not allowing cross-examination, only if “the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.”
Id.
§ 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii)(IV). Because U’s testimony is the heart of the Government’s case, it is
hard to believe that this last prong would be met.
9
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
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obtain explosives, but A consistently, even indignantly, declines. This
could be because she is not the terrorist that U says she is, or it could be that
she is sufficiently networked into a real terrorist organization that she does
not need, and is in fact very careful not to work with people who have not
been carefully vetted by her or other al Qaeda members she trusts.
What should the government do? The traditional answer from civil
libertarians is that the government must limit itself to continuing to police
A, trying to apprehend and prosecute her if and when she takes action that
would constitute a crime, hopefully before she causes any harm. 10 That is,
the government has to hope it can catch her attempting or conspiring to
commit a terrorist act, providing material support to terrorist organizations,
or committing some other crime that does not involve completing a violent
terrorist act. 11 On the other side of the spectrum, those who take the idea
that the U.S. is at war with al Qaeda most seriously would call for
preventively detaining A as an enemy combatant (EC). 12 Even President
Obama, for all of his respect for the rule of law, seems pulled to this side of
the spectrum. After saying that “[w]e are going to exhaust every avenue
that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a danger to our
country,” he admitted that “there may be a number of people who cannot be
prosecuted for past crimes, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security
of the United States.” 13 He included in that list those who “made it clear
that they want to kill Americans.” As he said, “[t]hese are people who, in
effect, remain at war with the United States.”14 Granted, he was talking
about aliens detained in Guantanamo, not U.S. citizens. But his logic could
easily be extended to cover U.S. citizens as well. No doubt, any responsible

10

See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuitjustice.pdf.
11
These are only the most obvious crimes the government could seek to use to prosecute
A before he causes any harm. For a more complete list, see ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note
10, ch. V.
12
See, e.g., al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 284–93, 293–351 (opinions of Judges Williams and
Wilkinson); Jack Goldsmith, Don’t Try Terrorists, Lock Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010,
at A21.
13
See President Barack Obama, Protecting Our Security and Our Values (May 21, 2009)
(transcript available at the National Archives) [hereinafter Protecting Our Security]; see also
Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277
(Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/
executive-order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava
[hereinafter
Periodic Review] (more recent executive order establishing procedures for the ongoing
military detention of Guantanamo detainees).
14
Protecting Our Security, supra note 13.
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administration following that logic would want to ensure that U.S. citizens
who seem to be members of or collaborators with al Qaeda would have a
fair opportunity to contest their designation as ECs. 15 The point, however,
is that these procedures would be much more flexible—with more room for
hearsay and a lower burden of proof—than the procedures used in either
civilian trials or military commissions. 16
I have argued elsewhere that the government could be justified in
putting U.S. citizens in short-term preventive detention, 17 but not long-term
preventive detention. Short-term detention is not such a great burden that
we cannot expect the innocent to endure it, while the government tries to
determine whether they are in fact innocent, for the sake of national
security. For example, we subject people who are awaiting trial, and who
therefore have not yet been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, to
short-term preventive detention if they are considered dangerous.18
Moreover, short-term detention has some obvious benefits, both in allowing
the government to interrogate terrorism suspects, and in disrupting
suspects’ plans and relationships with other terrorists. 19
Long-term detention—the line is hard to draw, but in many different
legal contexts six months seems to mark a transition from short-term to
long-term detention 20—by contrast, is a great burden on an individual. It is
more, I argue in Part III, than we can ask an innocent person to endure for
the safety of others. Even if the detention is not meant to be punitive, the
effect is sufficiently severe that an autonomous U.S. citizen 21—one who has
reached a threshold capacity to use practical reason to frame and pursue a
15

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(discussing the need for adequate procedural protections for U.S. citizens held as enemy
combatants).
16
See id. at 533–34; see also Periodic Review, supra note 13 (detailing new procedures
for review of combatant status); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008)
(pointing out that the procedures for enemy combatants are evolving towards those of
criminal trials, but not all the way).
17
See Walen, supra note 5, at subpart III.B.
18
See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
19
See Mathew Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and
Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 35 (2009).
20
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001); Walen, supra note 5 (discussing the
Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 78); see also Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1) (2006)).
21
I focus only on U.S. citizens because even legally resident aliens can be deported for
suspected terrorist activities. Insofar as they are prosecuted, they have the same due process
rights as U.S. citizens. But they lack the same fundamental right to be released and policed
if not prosecuted. See Walen, supra note 5, at subpart III.E.
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conception of a good life 22—may be subjected to it only if he has been
convicted, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a crime for which a long-term
sentence or loss of the right not to be subjected to long-term preventive
detention is a fitting punishment. 23 If there is reasonable doubt that he is
guilty—and it is hard to eliminate such doubt unless and until the defendant
has had a fair opportunity to confront the evidence against him, something
he may not be able to do if certain witnesses are not available—then I stand
with the civil libertarians and say that such people must not be subjected to
long-term preventive detention.
Let us now add the dimension of a threat. Suppose that a fellow
member of A’s mosque, M, comes forward and tells the FBI that A has told
him that she, A, is a jihadist who plans to detonate a bomb in Los Angeles. 24
Does this make a difference? One might say that it is merely corroboration
of what U has told the U.S. government. If M does not provide new
information sufficient to convict A of either conspiring or attempting to
commit terrorist acts, then he cannot help the government prosecute A.
Indeed, even if A had been taken in by the FBI and, under interrogation,
said the same thing to the FBI 25—that she is a jihadist and that she plans to
blow up a major building in Los Angeles—one might think that the civil
libertarian position would require the government to let her go and wait for
her to actually attempt or conspire to carry out her plan. 26
That, however, would arguably be a reductio ad absurdum of the civil
libertarian position. Surely the government should be able to detain A to

22

I use the concept of autonomy here in the descriptive sense identified by Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. in Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).
23
This sort of connection between conviction and detention is also embraced, for
constitutional reasons, by Justices Scalia and Stevens in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24
This example is modeled off the case of Steven Parr, who told his cellmate in a
Wisconsin prison that he intended to blow up the Reuss Federal Plaza in Milwaukee. The
cellmate then sent a letter warning the FBI of Parr’s threats. Parr was convicted of
threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against a federal building in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(3) (2006). See United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008).
25
People do say such things to their captors. Consider the case of Abdallah al-Ajmi, a
Kuwaiti held in Guantanamo from 2002 to 2005. An officer at an administrative review
board hearing testified: “In August of 2004, Al Ajmi wanted to make sure that . . . the
tribunal members know that he is now a jihadist, an enemy combatant and that he would kill
as many Americans as he possible [sic] can.” Rajiv Chandrasekaran, From Captive to
Suicide Bomber, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1.
26
Stephen J. Morse says almost exactly this about armed robbers: “Imagine . . . a threetime convicted armed robber who threatens, completely believably, to commit a fourth
crime. . . . In the legal world we now inhabit . . . criminal conviction in the absence of at
least attempted crime would [not] be possible to prevent future dangerous conduct.” Stephen
J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 265–66 (1999).
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ensure that she does not commit a terrible crime. Indeed, given the limited
effectiveness of surveillance without detention—explored in Part III—longterm detention is really the only way to ensure that A does not commit
terrorist acts. But if A’s statements—which do not mention her conspiring
with others—merely corroborated what the government already believes,
then the government still may not be able to prosecute A. And if the civil
libertarian position implies that the government has no other option for
long-term detention—if long-term preventive detention were off the table—
then the civil libertarian position would be too extreme.
What A has said about her intentions is not, however, merely
corroborative of what the government already believes. By stating her
intention to commit terrorist acts, A commits a new crime, for which she
can be prosecuted, the crime of threatening to commit a terrorist act. 27
Prosecuting her on that basis has the advantage of putting the government
to the test of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she did indeed
threaten to commit terrorist acts—as opposed to joking, protesting,
blustering, or performing some other speech act protected by the First
Amendment—and that she deserves to be incarcerated for a long period of
time as a result. 28
Prosecuting A for a terrorist threat fits the civil libertarian commitment
to avoiding long-term preventive detention. Moreover, the balance it
strikes between liberty and security seems appropriate, given basic civil
libertarian commitments. As I said above, if there is a reasonable doubt that
A meant what she said, then the government should not take away her most
fundamental liberty, her freedom from incarceration,29 for a long period of
time. This is not to impugn the credibility of U’s information. But unless A
has an opportunity to challenge U, U’s saying that A is working with al
Qaeda should not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
27
See supra note 7 (discussing 18 U.S.C §§ 2332a and 2332b (2006)). It is worth adding
that the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Related to International Civil
Aviation, Art.1(3), also makes it a crime under international law to “credibly threaten”
various unlawful acts against international civil aviation. International Civil Aviation
Organization, Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Related to International Civil
Aviation, art.1(3) (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.icao.int/DCAS2010/restr/
docs/beijing_convention_multi.pdf.
28
The maximum sentence under § 2332b for threatening to commit an act of
international terrorism is ten years, but the maximum sentence under § 2332a for threatening
to use a weapon of mass destruction is life in prison. In addition, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines allow a twelve-level enhancement for “an offense . . . that involved or was
intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3A1.4 (2002).
29
As Justice Breyer put it: “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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government’s unwillingness to call on U to testify means that there could be
no proof beyond a reasonable doubt of A’s being guilty of a terrorismrelated crime unless and until she did something more. The difference A’s
statements to M make, then, is not just that they corroborate what U said;
they constitute a crime in their own right. They allow the government to
bring A to trial, to present M’s evidence, to allow A to contest it, and to
allow a jury to decide if A is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sum, prosecuting suspected terrorists like A for threatening to
commit terrorist acts gives the government another important tool to fight
terrorism. This tool may come into play in those cases that seem to provide
the strongest case for using long-term preventive detention on U.S. citizens:
those in which the government has good reason to believe that someone is
plotting to commit a terrorist act but cannot, for whatever reason,30 prove
that beyond a reasonable doubt. If such a person sincerely states his
intention to engage in terrorist acts, then that action by itself not only
corroborates the view that he is dangerous, it is also a crime in its own right
that gives the government a basis for a prosecution.
III. LIMITS ON USING PREVENTIVE DETENTION
One might respond to the claim that the government can prosecute
suspected terrorists (STs) who threaten to commit terrorist acts by saying
that that option, helpful as it might be, is not as helpful as also having the
option of subjecting STs to long-term preventive detention (LTPD). I have
argued at length against that position,31 and in favor of the view that respect
for the dignity of autonomous individuals requires the government to
release and police, after (at most) a short period of preventive detention, its
own citizens who it cannot convict of a crime for which long-term punitive
detention is a fitting punishment. I am not alone in arguing for that sort of

30
Reasons other than that a witness is undercover could include that the evidence was
tainted by torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; that the evidence was gathered
in a war zone by military officers who were not concerned with preserving it for
prosecutorial use; or that the evidence may include sensitive intelligence sources and
methods. But see GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 23 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]
(stating that the “principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases [of Guantanamo detainees]
deemed infeasible . . . typically did not stem from concerns over protecting sensitive sources
or methods from disclosure, or concerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted”).
31
Walen, supra note 5.
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conclusion, 32 but I believe I am nearly alone in arguing for it on principled,
rather than pragmatic, grounds. 33 I will summarize that argument here.
A. LEGAL AND MORAL BACKGROUND

Before starting, it is important to be clear that no one, myself included,
has argued that the U.S., acting in cooperation with the Afghan government,
cannot justifiably hold Taliban or al Qaeda fighters who participate in the
insurrection against that government in LTPD. The insurrections or civil
wars in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq create war zones in
which the capacity of the state to police the residents of the territory is
highly compromised. They are places where the conditions are of the sort
which allow the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.34 In
such conditions, STs can be subjected to LTPD. The argument that follows
concerns U.S. citizens whose release would be into the U.S. where, at least
as I write this, the police and the courts are fully functioning.
My position is, however, inconsistent with the position adopted by the
majority of the Supreme Court Justices writing in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 35

32
See Michael L. Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventive
Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2005); Morse, supra note 26; Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003).
33
Corrado’s argument has the ring of a principled argument, but it is fundamentally
pragmatic, turning on questions of line-drawing and abuse of power. Corrado, supra note
32, at 108–09. Morse takes a position that starts with an assumption very much in line with
my autonomy-respecting position: that “[t]he state must leave people alone . . . unless they
are nonresponsibly dangerous or unless they harm others.” Morse, supra note 26, at 294.
But then he shows that he is willing to balance that assumption with the thought that
“[e]veryone also has a right to be free from unjustifiable, intentional harm from others.” Id.
Thus, insofar as we can predict that someone will be dangerous—something he thinks we
cannot do now and are unlikely to be able to do in the foreseeable future—we can use pure
preventive detention on them. Slobogin’s argument is more thoroughly principled, but it is
also unsound, claiming that those who cannot be deterred are outside the reach of the
criminal law, and that it is only those who are outside the reach of the criminal law that can
be subject to LTPD. Slobogin, supra note 32, at 5. This is an unsound argument for two
basic reasons. First, it is simply false that those who cannot be deterred because they are
more dedicated to committing a crime than to avoiding punishment are outside the reach of
the criminal law. As responsible agents, they may fully deserve the punishment they get.
Second, it is also not true that only those who may not be subjected to criminal punishment
may be subjected to LTPD, as the case of prisoners of war (POWs) who commit war crimes
demonstrates.
34
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (allowing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
“when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).
35
542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). My position is a moral one, but following Ronald Dworkin
I think that constitutional principles, such as the protection of liberty by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, should be interpreted by appeal to the
underlying moral principles, at least insofar as doing so is consistent with the text and history
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The plurality opinion, as well as the opinions of Justices Souter (joined by
Ginsburg) and Thomas, all hold that it is constitutionally permissible for the
U.S. to detain its citizens as ECs. 36 The plurality opinion based its decision
in large part on Ex parte Quirin, 37 which held that U.S. citizens can be tried
as ECs for violations of the law of war. The plurality inferred that if U.S.
citizens can be tried as ECs, then they can be detained as ECs as well. 38
But in my view Justices Scalia and Stevens, dissenting in Hamdi, were
correct: the U.S. may not detain its own citizens as ECs. 39 Perhaps it may
try them as ECs, if military commissions have jurisdiction over anyone who
is accused of committing war crimes. 40 But ECs may not be subjected to
LTPD simply because they are ECs. They may be preventively detained for
long periods of time, I argue below, only if they cannot be held
accountable.41
One central premise of my position is that war is not fundamentally
different from peace; people have rights that must be respected in both
conditions. Cicero said: “[D]uring war, the laws are silent” (silent enim
legis inter arma). 42 But as Justice Barak, President (Emeritus) of the High
of constitutional interpretation. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996).
36
Justice Souter objected that the Non-Detention Act bars the government from holding
its own citizens as ECs. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541. But this objection is statutory, not
constitutional.
37
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
38
542 U.S. at 519. The plurality opinion left it unclear whether U.S. citizens could be
detained only if fighting for a traditional national enemy on a traditional battlefield, or if they
could also be detained if they fought for al Qaeda, with no affiliation to a government or
former government of a nation that, like the Taliban, attacked the U.S. Id. at 521 (“If the
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that
informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not
the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters
apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.”); see also Corrado, supra note 32, at 117–18. Other
courts have divided on that point. For example, the Fourth Circuit in al-Marri voted 5-to-4
to allow legal resident aliens, and by implication, U.S. citizens—an implication that the court
accepted but that I reject—to be detained as ECs. See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213
(4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct.
1545 (2009).
39
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40
The Court takes this position in Ex parte Quirin. 317 U.S. at 37–38. Some scholars
criticize Quirin on this basis. See, e.g., David J. Danelski, The Saboteur’s Case, 1 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 61, 79 (1996) (arguing that the Court blurred the line between the law of war and
military law, only the latter of which is enacted by Congress).
41
Being unaccountable is not the same as being undeterrable. Contra Slobogin, supra
note 32, at 4.
42
See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, H.C.J. 769/02, ¶ 61 (Dec.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/
02007690.a34.pdf.
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Court of Justice in Israel, wrote: this “saying[] [is] regrettable. [It] reflect[s]
neither the existing law nor the desirable law . . . . It is when the cannons
roar that we especially need the laws.” 43
It is now clear that humanitarian law regulates war as a law-governed
activity, one in which the law is informed by humanitarian moral
concerns. 44 My moral point, however, goes beyond the mere relevance of
humanitarian concerns. Not only does the law apply in war as in peace, its
moral foundations are the same in war and in peace; in both, the law must
respect people’s basic rights. In saying this, I follow the many just war
theorists who treat war as an activity within the reach of our normal moral
concepts, one that should be regulated by appeal to normal moral reasons. 45
And it is in that spirit that I argue that all detentions must be justifiable
within a moral framework that respects the liberty rights of autonomous
individuals.
To be clear, I am not suggesting a model in which autonomy is a
“value” to be promoted. That allows it to be merely one more good, even if
a very important one, to be put in the balance with security. Rather, the
model I rely on treats autonomy as a capacity that gives those who have it a
kind of moral status that we might call dignity. Dignity is not a value to be
promoted either; it is a status that must be respected. 46
B. THE AUTONOMY RESPECTING MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION TO
POWS AND STS

The liberal, dignity-respecting framework I am working with supports
what I call the autonomy respecting model (AR model) of detention. Its
core principle is that individuals who can be adequately policed and held
criminally liable for their illegal choices as normal autonomous agents, and
who can choose whether their interactions with others will be
impermissibly harmful or not, can be subjected to long-term detention only
if they have been convicted of a crime for which long-term punitive

43

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Thus the International Committee of the Red Cross, the official reporter of the Geneva
Conventions, defines international humanitarian law, also known as the law of war, as “a set
of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.” See
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW? (2004), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/humanitarian-lawfactsheet.htm.
45
See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS (2d ed. 1992); Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective
Violence in Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148 (2005).
46
See F.M. Kamm, Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the
Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 354, 382–83 (1992).
44
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detention or the loss of the right not to be subjected to LTPD is a fitting
punishment, or both.
One way to break this down into its component parts is as follows.
Those who can be detained fall into two basic categories: those subject to
punitive detention and those subject to preventive detention. Punitive
detention respects autonomy because it is based on a person’s autonomous
choice to commit a crime. Those subject to preventive detention can be
detained short-term for the sake of security, because even innocent people
can be expected to make small sacrifices for the sake of the greater
welfare. 47 People may properly be subjected to LTPD, however, only if
they fall into one of four categories: (1) they lack the normal autonomous
capacities to govern their own choices; 48 (2) they have, by virtue of one or
more criminal convictions, lost their right to be treated as autonomous and
accountable; 49 (3) they have an independent duty to avoid contact with
others, because such contact would be impermissibly harmful, and LTPD
simply reinforces this duty; 50 or (4) they are incapable of being adequately
policed and held accountable for their choices. Importantly, prisoners of
war (POWs) and some STs—I explain immediately below which STs—fit
into this last category, and thus, their detention can be accounted for in the
AR model. If, however, a given ST does not fit into this last category or
any of the other categories just mentioned—and many STs do not—then he
must either be tried and convicted of a crime or be released and policed like
any criminal defendant who is acquitted at trial.
As the concern of this Article is with the detention of STs, I focus here
only on the fourth of these categories. The basic thought is that there are
two ways of being unaccountable: intrinsically and extrinsically. Those
with insufficient autonomous capacity are intrinsically incapable of being

47
Consider the sacrifice jurors are required to make for the sake of providing justice to
the community.
48
For example, the mentally ill who are a danger to themselves or others. See Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (noting the state’s “power to protect the community from
the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill”).
49
This is an idea that I develop in Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive
Detention: Lost Status as an Element of a Just Punishment, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming
2011). I argue that this view provides the best possible account of a number of detention
practices, such as the civil (preventive) detention of sexually violent predators who have
served their prison sentences. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
50
The obvious example here is quarantine. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (“[S]tate quarantine laws and
state laws for the purpose of preventing, eradicating, or controlling the spread of contagious
or infectious diseases, are not repugnant to the Constitution . . . .”).
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held accountable as any normal autonomous person for their actions.51
Those who cannot adequately be policed are extrinsically incapable of
being held accountable, in anything like the normal way, for their actions.
The moral relevance of both is the same: one who cannot adequately be
held accountable can be subjected to LTPD if doing so is necessary to
ensure that he does not pose a risk to others that outweighs the loss of his
own liberty. This sort of balancing is appropriate when a person is not
accountable because accountability is a precondition of treating someone as
an autonomous agent who should be released and policed, rather than be
subjected to LTPD.
POWs typically fit into this category of those who may be subjected to
LTPD because the typical POW is, and will remain until the war is over or
he is released from military service, privileged to engage in combat with the
detaining power. 52 If he escapes, he has the right to take up arms again. 53
That means that the detaining power not only cannot hold him criminally
responsible for his past violent actions—at least as long as those acts do not
violate the laws of war that require him, for example, not to target
noncombatants 54—it also may not hold him criminally responsible for any
future acts of violence that conform to the law of war. The state is not
required to allow itself to be attacked. Therefore, it can subject POWs to
LPTD to prevent them from attacking. And it can do so without
disrespecting them as autonomous people because their legal status makes
them unaccountable.
Some STs can also be justifiably subjected to LTPD for a related
reason. On the assumption that the U.S. has no obligation to release and
police alien STs in its own territory, 55 the question is: Would they be

51

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (discussing the diminished
culpability of the mentally retarded). They may still be held accountable, but their disability
mitigates their potential culpability, and makes it inappropriate to hold them fully
accountable. Id.
52
See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9 (2004).
53
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 91, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (“Prisoners of war who have
made good their escape [including by rejoining their own armed forces] and who are
recaptured, shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape”—
implying that escaped prisoners have the right to take up arms again).
54
See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 361 (Dieter Fleck
ed., 1995).
55
This assumption seems sound as a general matter in immigration law, but there might
be exceptions for cases in which the U.S. is responsible for depriving a detainee of the
opportunity to make a decent life for himself elsewhere. That is arguably the case for the
Uighur detainees held in Guantanamo. But see Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
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adequately policed if released to their home country or to some other
country willing to take them? The answer in some cases—for example,
Yemen 56—is no. It is not that they have the legal status of being beyond
criminal prosecution for future acts of terror. The problem is (a) that their
legal status does not require the U.S. to release them in its own territory and
police them there and (b) that where they do have a legal claim to reside,
the chance that they would not be held accountable for any future acts of
terror is too large. As a result, they are effectively unaccountable and can
be subjected to LTPD without disrespecting them as autonomous people.57
What about LTPD for U.S. citizens who are also STs? There the
argument regarding the state’s obligation to police is different. The state
exists to serve its citizens, so it cannot say to a citizen, as it can to an alien,
that it will not accept the responsibility of policing him. Of course, even if
a state has an obligation to police its own citizens, there may still be
questions about whether it can adequately do so at a reasonable cost, given
the technologies and the political situation at a given period of time. If not,
then again LTPD may be justifiable because the person cannot be held
accountable. But there is little reason to think that adequate policing is not
almost always possible in the U.S., at least in the current condition in which
no one argues that habeas can be suspended.58
Indeed, in the period since 9/11 the policing power of the U.S. has
been quite successful at providing domestic security. 59 Admittedly, there
have been some cases in which the system did not work properly, and it was
only because of the relative incompetence of the would-be terrorists that the

Cir. 2009) (holding the federal courts lack the authority to order Guantanamo detainees
released into the United States).
56
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 18 (discussing the security problems in Yemen
and the way they interfere with releasing Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo).
57
In this regard, it makes sense that roughly 40% of the detainees left in Guantanamo are
from Yemen. See id. at 14.
58
As Justice Souter wrote, explaining his interpretation of the AUMF: “[T]here is no
reason to think Congress might have perceived any need to augment Executive power to deal
with dangerous citizens within the United States, given the well-stocked statutory arsenal of
defined criminal offenses covering the gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to
terrorists might commit.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 547 (2004) (Souter, J,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No one
contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the
Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause
[suspending the writ of habeas corpus].”).
59
See Scott Shane, Year of Plots: A 2nd Prism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at A1
(“Exactly 14 of the approximately 14,000 murders in the United States last year resulted
from allegedly jihadist attacks: 13 people shot at Fort Hood in Texas in November and one at
a military recruiting station in Little Rock, Ark., in June.”).
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U.S. did not suffer a terrible attack. 60 Thus, one could easily imagine that
the U.S. might have suffered one or more serious terrorist attacks since
9/11. But the problem in these cases is not that the U.S. government is
allowing people who it knows are dangerous to roam freely; the problem is
that it is unable to figure out who is dangerous. Therefore, it seems
implausible that allowing citizen STs to be held in LTPD would provide a
significant increase in overall security.
This is not to deny that a situation could arise in which a U.S. citizen
could justifiably be subjected to LTPD as an ST. If an ST had particular
knowledge or skills that made him distinctively valuable to a terrorist group
trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and there was no way (a) to
prevent him from passing on that information or using those skills while he
retained his liberty to move about in society or (b) to prosecute him for a
past crime, including threat crimes, and if the government nonetheless had
sufficient reason to suspect him of having an interest in working with a
terrorist group, then LTPD could be justifiable. But this theoretical
possibility is, I believe, as unlikely to occur in reality as the ticking time
bomb example that is so often cited to justify the theoretical possibility that
torture might be justified. 61 I am not suggesting that the odds of a terrorist
attack with a weapon of mass destruction are exceedingly low. 62 I am
saying that the U.S. government either will not know that a particular
individual poses an especially great threat, or, if it does know that, then it
will be able to prosecute or adequately monitor him to prevent him from
committing terrorist acts. As I argued in Part II, there might be a gap if the
government could not prosecute those it comes to believe have the intention
of committing terrorist acts because of things they say. But as long as
terrorist threats can be criminalized, there should be no need to subject U.S.
citizens to LTPD as STs. 63
60

See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Passengers’ Quick Action Halted Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1 (describing how if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had been a bit
more competent, he would have killed hundreds on his Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines
flight on Christmas Day 2009).
61
See David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Bomb (Georgetown Law Faculty Working
Papers, Paper 68, 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/68.
62
See Christopher C. Joyner & Alexander Ian Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a
Globalizing World: Assessing the Threat and the Emerging Management Regime, 45 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 203, 205 n.4 (discussing a wide range of estimates, from 1% to 50%, that experts
give of the likelihood of a terrorist nuclear attack in the next decade).
63
My conclusion here is very much like one that David Cole reaches when he says:
Given conspiracy laws, it is difficult to imagine cases where the government has reliable
evidence that an individual is going to commit an imminent terrorist act, but lacks probable cause
of any criminal activity. If it lacks even probable cause, society should take the risk associated
with continued surveillance, as we do with all other crimes, rather than permit preventive
detention.
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C. OBJECTION AND REPLY

One might object that my AR model cannot be relied on because its
account of the LTPD of POWs is implausible. That is, one might claim that
it is an essential feature of war that POWs can be detained until the
cessation of active hostilities. 64 And one might object that this feature of
war has nothing to do with respecting the dignity of autonomous people; it
simply reflects the unique security needs that arise in war.
It turns out that it is possible to test whether this objection is sound.
Under the laws of war, provided for in the Third Geneva Convention, a
POW may renounce his status as a privileged combatant—an act called
giving his parole—by giving his word that if released he will not again take
up arms against the detaining power. 65 By giving his parole a POW
changes his status such that if he is captured again, having violated his
word, he is subject to criminal penalties.66 The possibility of giving his
parole at least opens up the legal possibility of policing a former POW’s
future actions. And this provides a test for the AR model because it opens
up the possibility that a detaining country would have an obligation to
release POWs whom it paroles.
This test may initially seem to speak against the AR model. Clearly
the U.S. would not release all POWs who wanted to give their parole; doing
so would be too dangerous. 67 In fact, however, parole presents no problem
for the AR model. There are two reasons, consistent with the AR model,
why the option of giving one’s parole is not and should not be made widely
available to POWs. And in the few cases that could conceivably fall
David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 747 (2009). The primary difference is that I think one has to add the
crime of making terrorist threats to conspiracy law to close the gap between security needs
and criminal law’s tools.
64
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The capture and detention of lawful
combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal
agreement and practice, are important incidents of war.”) (internal quotation marks and
square brackets omitted).
65
GC III, supra note 53, at art. 21; see also Berman, supra note 52, at 9 n.14 (“This
practice may now seem somewhat quaint, but it effectively highlights the purpose of the
detention of prisoners of war.”).
66
JEAN DE PREUX, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 181
(Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY GC III] (“[A] prisoner of war who is
released on parole and is recaptured bearing arms may be tried and sentenced by the
Detaining Power.”).
67
GC III, supra note 53, at art. 21, ¶ 2. Parole seems to have been used in World War II
for those who might need to be released from a detention facility for reasons of “health or
hygiene.” COMMENTARY GC III, supra note 65, at 179. The obvious reason it was restricted
to these conditions is that a broader usage would have been too dangerous for the detaining
powers.
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outside those reasons, POWs should be entitled to give their parole and be
released.
The first reason parole is not widely available is that the POWs’ home
countries may not allow their soldiers to accept it. 68 If their home countries
will not allow them to give their parole, then it would be unreasonable for
the U.S. to treat them as having abandoned their legal status as privileged to
use force. The U.S. itself does not allow its soldiers to give their parole.
The U.S. military code of conduct says, “I will accept neither parole nor
special favors from the enemy.” 69 Insofar as the U.S. is holding POWs
from a country with a similar policy, then parole would not be an option;
those POWs would be legally barred from acquiring a duty not to fight
again. Thus, they would retain their privileged combatant status and, for
that reason, would not be accountable for their future use of force.
Second, even if the enemy would allow its soldiers to give their parole,
it would be peculiar and highly unusual to find an enemy who could be
relied upon to enforce its soldiers’ duties to keep their word. I am not
denying that countries who allow their soldiers to be released on parole
assume this duty. The Geneva Conventions are clear that “the Power on
which [POWs released on parole] depend is bound neither to require nor to
accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or promise
given.” 70 I am suggesting, however, that during war it would not be
reasonable to expect the enemy to be scrupulous about enforcing this duty.
The commentary to the Geneva Conventions supports this skepticism,
noting that the text of the Geneva Conventions does not “specify the
attitude to be taken by that Power, from the penal or disciplinary point of
view, in regard to breach of parole by a member of its armed forces.”71
Assuming that the U.S. cannot rely on its enemies to enforce a
parolee’s duty to stay out of the fight, this suffices to explain why POWs
cannot simply give their word and regain their status as accountable agents.
The U.S. can threaten to punish POWs whom it releases on parole and
68

GC III, supra note 53, at art. 21, ¶ 2: “Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly
released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they
depend.” (emphasis added). In other words, the countries for which they fight may not
allow them to give parole.
69
Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057, 3 C.F.R. 1954–58 Comp. 266 (1955), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,017, 42 Fed. Reg. 57941 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12,633, 53 Fed. Reg. 10355
(1988). The Department of Defense also says, “The United States does not authorize any
Military Service member to sign or enter into any such parole agreement.” Dep’t of Defense
Directive 1300.7, Enclosure 2, ¶ B3a(5). This policy makes sense insofar as soldiers might
seek to use capture and parole as a way of evading their military duty.
70
GC III, supra note 53, at art. 21, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
71
COMMENTARY GC III, supra note 65, at 182.
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subsequently recaptures again using force against the U.S., but given that
these former POWs would be outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., that
would be a very tenuous form of accountability. In reality, POWs would
effectively be released only on their own honor. 72 If they lack honor, there
is little that the former detaining power can do about it. They can be held
accountable in one sense: it would be just to punish them if they are caught,
tried and convicted. But they are effectively unaccountable in another
sense: they are very unlikely ever to be caught, tried and convicted. This
makes their situation similar to STs from Yemen: 73 the effectiveness of
policing to provide for security does not reach the threshold level required
for the U.S. to be obliged to release them. That is why LTPD, in this
context, would be justified.74
If, however, the U.S. could trust that an enemy would enforce the duty
of parolees to stay out of the fight, then it is quite plausible to insist that it
would be obligated to give POWs the option of accepting parole. For the
U.S. cannot simply choose to treat someone as unaccountable—except
insofar as it can choose not to assume responsibility to police aliens. LTPD
can be justified only if the U.S. confronts the fact that a person is not
accountable if released into any country obliged or willing to accept
responsibility for him. Thus, under the supposition, unrealistic as it may be,
that an enemy would enforce the duty of parolees to stay out of the fight,
they would be held accountable for any failure to respect their duty, and the
U.S. would then be obliged to release them and let the other country police
them. The reason this might seem like an unrealistic scenario is not that
POWs’ claims for liberty are lost during times of war; it is that the
conditions for holding paroled POWs accountable if they breach their duty
have not existed and are unlikely ever to exist. 75

72

“A person who gives his parole gives a personal undertaking on his honour for which
he is in the first place responsible to himself.” Id.
73
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
74
I am not saying that parole is a pointless piece of dead letter law. It was sometimes
used in World War II, and one can imagine that it would be used again in certain limited
cases, such as when a detainee, due to ill health, seems very unlikely to take up arms again.
75
One might want to object that the law of war was not designed to respect liberal
notions of autonomy. In fact, it was negotiated over generations between countries, many of
which were in no way liberal. As its alternative name, humanitarian law, suggests, it was
designed simply to minimize the brutality of war while also allowing the warring parties to
take those steps essential to their security. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946)
(describing the purpose of the law of war as being “to protect civilian populations and
prisoners of war from brutality”). Military necessity, one might say, provided the only
reason for not releasing POWs before the cessation of active hostilities. In response, I am
happy to admit that the AR model was not in play in devising the law of war. Nonetheless, I
think it is an important moral fact that the LTPD of POWs is consistent with respecting the
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In sum, the detention of POWs fits the AR model. Moreover, the AR
model provides plausible normative guidance for the detention of STs. It
holds that alien STs, whom the U.S. is not obliged to release and police, can
be subjected to LTPD if they would be released to countries that would not
adequately police them. At the same time, it holds that the U.S. must
release and police its own citizen STs if it cannot convict them of a crime
for which punitive detention, or loss of the right not to be subjected to
LTPD, is a fitting punishment.
IV. THE UNSATISFYING NATURE OF MONITORING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
If we proceed on the assumption that the U.S. may not subject its own
citizens to LTPD as ECs, then it has to release and police those whom it
cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt have committed a serious crime
that justifies long-term detention. One might be more or less sanguine
about the prospects of such policing, however. If one is sanguine about it,
then one might not feel the need to prosecute the ultimate inchoate crime,
stating the intention to commit a crime. 76 One might prefer to wait until the
suspected person has been caught attempting or conspiring to commit a
crime.
The point of this Part of the Article is to argue that one should not be
so sanguine about the powers of policing. Even if the police use the most
sophisticated surveillance tools, augmented by some sort of restraining
order that might be obtainable with evidence that does not rise to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of having committed a crime, 77 their policing
will be relatively ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks. Of course
surveillance and restraining orders would help ensure that STs do not
successfully perpetrate a terrorist attack. My point is only that such tools
liberty of autonomous agents. That is why we, as citizens of a liberal country, should be
willing to accept the practice going forward.
76
I refer to stating the intention to commit terrorist acts as the ultimate inchoate crime
because it attaches criminal liability to nothing but forming a criminal intention and
expressing that fact. Arguably conspiracy law at least sometimes operates the same way,
when it requires no overt act beyond an agreement. See the MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5)
(1985) (not requiring an overt act for conspiracies to commit first- or second-degree
felonies). But even then, the crime of stating a terrorist threat is at the far end of the inchoate
spectrum.
77
A restraining order or civil protection order, at least in the context of domestic
violence, typically can be obtained on a temporary or emergency basis ex parte. A
“permanent” order, that typically lasts one to two years, will be awarded only after a hearing
in which the normal rules of civil procedure apply. An order will then be granted only if the
facts alleged in the petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, including
evidence that the threatening behavior is likely to continue. See Judith A. Smith, Battered
Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 93, 100–01 (2005).
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have significantly limited effectiveness when compared with detention, and
therefore, given the magnitude of the threat presented by terrorists, we have
reason to prosecute the crime of threatening to commit a terrorist act.
Consider first what we can expect to do with surveillance. If there is
probable cause to believe that a person is involved in criminal activity
(including, of course, terrorist activity), a warrant could be obtained to
wiretap his phone or computer communication.78 Or, if there is probable
cause to believe that he is an agent of an FTO, a FISA warrant can be
obtained to do the same thing. 79 But someone plotting to commit a terrorist
act, particularly once he has already been detained and questioned, must
suspect that the government will be watching him in that way, and will
avoid saying anything revealing on the phone or in mail (whether electronic
or paper). He will communicate in person.
Another way to use surveillance would be to track his movements,
either by putting a tracking device on his car80 or even on his person. 81 But
where one goes is not itself incriminating. If he went to the home of other
STs, that might be helpful in building a conspiracy case. But it would only
be a first step. Without more, there would be insufficient evidence to
convict. 82
The most useful form of surveillance would involve undercover agents
who offer their services to help him carry out a terrorist plot. 83 If someone
is not well networked into a terrorist organization that has done careful
vetting, it would be hard for him to know that a person is an undercover
agent who cannot be trusted. But if someone either has the capacity to
operate essentially as a lone wolf, or has the right connections to help him
vet his contacts, he will not easily be taken in by undercover agents.

78

U.S. CONST. amend IV.
See supra note 6.
80
This was recently upheld as not being a search under the Fourth Amendment in United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2010).
81
Clearly, one does have an expectation of privacy in one’s person, even if not in one’s
car. Therefore some sort of probable cause would be required to get a warrant before such a
tracking device could be used. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“[A]
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”).
82
Conspiracy presupposes an agreement. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985).
Merely meeting with people is clearly insufficient to establish agreement.
83
See, e.g., Colin Miner, Liz Robbins & Erik Eckholm, Bomb Plot Foiled at Holiday
Event in Portland, Ore., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1 (describing the case of Mohamed
Osman Mohamud, a nineteen-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen from Somalia, who was
arrested after he tried to blow up a fake bomb in the center of Portland, Oregon, where the
bomb was given to him by an undercover agent).
79
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A combination of restraining orders and monitoring could be more
effective than monitoring alone. If someone is banned from buying guns or
bomb-making materials, and then goes to a place where these things can be
purchased, there would be reason to follow up and search his residence for
breaking the restraining order. If he is banned from meeting with certain
other individuals who are also STs, then he could be prosecuted for
violating the order if he is seen in their company or at their homes. 84 The
problem is that it would be impossible, without becoming a complete police
state, to track all the people who might serve as intermediaries between
STs. Thus, even this combination will have limited effectiveness against a
cautious terrorist.
These limitations are illustrated by the occasional failure of the most
draconian surveillance policies in the Western world—policies that go as
close to preventive detention as possible without being preventive
detention. The policies I am referring to are British “control orders.” 85
There are two kinds of orders, the less restrictive ones that are held not to
derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights, and the more
restrictive ones that do derogate from that Convention. 86 Even the less
restrictive orders—which can be obtained if the Secretary of State has
“reasonable grounds for suspecting” that an individual is or has been
involved in terrorist activities 87—provide that those who are subjected to it
may:
be electronically tagged at all times; be required to abide by curfews (by remaining at
home or in a specified place between specified times, in the initial orders for up to 18
hours per day); have their passports taken away; be denied access to rail stations,
airports, and ports; have their telephone lines cut; have their contacts with others
outside the home severely limited; and be subject at any time to unannounced visits
and searches from the police and security services. They may be prohibited from
using specified articles or substances (for example mobile phones, faxes, pagers,
computers, and internet facilities); have their right to work or engage in other
activities limited; and suffer restrictions on association with other people, on
communication, movement, and residence. They may be required to report to a
specified person at specified times and places; . . . to provide information on demand;
and to permit anything to be removed from their home for the duration of the
order. . . . The range of restrictions that may be imposed is without limit and may be
renewed subject to twelve-monthly approvals by the courts. [Finally, b]reach of a

84

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (“Criminal contempt is a crime in the
ordinary sense.”).
85
These were established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.)
[hereinafter PTA].
86
See Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control
Orders, 60 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 174, 176–78 (2007).
87
Id. at 176 (citing PTA, supra note 85, at § 2(1)(a)).
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condition imposed by a Control Order is a criminal offense punishable by
88
imprisonment for up to five years.

It is hard to imagine a regime for surveillance and restriction of
behavior—other than house arrest or preventive detention in a secure
facility—that would be more effective in preventing terrorist activity on the
part of a particular individual.89 Nonetheless, there are good reasons to
doubt their efficacy.
Typically, controlees . . . are allowed to arrange to attend group prayers at places of
worship. . . . Controlees may be subject to curfew orders for large parts of the day and
night but move freely within in preset areas outside those hours. It is questionable
whether or not the determined terrorist will be unduly hindered by these patchy and
inconsistent restrictions. As one suspect subject to a Control Order has observed: “I
go everywhere now—on the underground, buses, the mosque. But I must be home by
7pm . . . . The government is playing games. If I am a security risk, why are they
90
letting me out to be with people?”

These points are confirmed by the fact that three of the first nineteen
people subjected to control orders went missing. 91 Therefore, if the goal is
to incapacitate people who have indicated their sincere intention to engage
in terrorism, nothing short of detention—severely restricting a person’s
freedom to communicate with others and move about freely—will suffice.
V. THE CRIME OF MAKING TERRORIST THREATS
Threats paradigmatically involve two parties: those who make threats
and those to whom the threats are directed. 92 The elements of the crime as
traditionally understood include “that the threat actually caused the person
threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or that of his or
her immediate family.” 93 There are, however, non-paradigmatic variations
that lack this element and are nonetheless criminal. One way threats can
lack this element is that they can fail to cause the relevant fear. Another

88

Id. at 179–80.
Indeed, this sort of regime seems extreme enough to be of dubious constitutionality.
The British House of Lords ruled in 2008 that eighteen-hour curfews amounted to a
deprivation of the right to liberty, as protected by the UK’s Human Rights Act. Afua Hirsh,
16-Hour Curfews Violate Rights, Court Hears, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 6, 2010, at 19.
Insofar as the U.S. Constitution embraces similar standards as the UK’s Human Rights Act,
a similar policy in the U.S. could run into constitutional problems. However, it could also be
argued that if the U.S. can detain STs in LTPD, then it can impose on them a less severe
deprivation of their liberty, such as is found in control orders.
90
Zedner, supra note 86, at 190–91.
91
Alan Travis & Alex Kumi, Manhunt as Terror Suspect Escapes Control Order,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 17, 2007, at 6.
92
See Corpus Juris Secondum on Threats, supra note 2, at § 3.
93
Id.
89
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way they can lack this element is if the actor has no reason to expect his
victims to fear what he will do, but he has announced his intention to
engage in violent, unlawful acts to others (although neither to his potential
victims nor to people who he can reasonably expect will transmit his threat
to his potential victims), thereby giving them reason to be concerned that he
intends to commit a violent crime.
In the wake of Watts v. United States, the first Supreme Court case to
discuss “true threats,” 94 at least one court, the Fourth Circuit, was fairly
sensitive to the significance of this last type of threat.95 But as the doctrine
evolved, confusion set in for both courts and commentators. In what
follows, I explain first how the current doctrine of true threats is incoherent
because of a failure to recognize that it encompasses two very different
types of crimes: one dealing with causing fear or disruption (including both
complete and inchoate crimes of causing fear and disruption), and the other
an essentially inchoate crime directed at unlawfully and violently causing
harm. Second, I explain how to make sense of the inchoate crime of stating
the intention to commit unlawful, violent crimes, especially terrorism—
while also developing the reasons for restricting the crime to threats to
perform violent crimes. Third, I defend this inchoate crime against the
objection that it takes the notion of inchoate crimes too far from completed
criminal acts.
A. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE TRUE THREATS DOCTRINE

1. Proper Conceptual Framework for Threat Crimes
As a first step towards demonstrating the incoherence of threat
doctrine, it is helpful to highlight the different interests the government has
in preventing threats. These, as first spelled out by the Supreme Court in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, are: “protecting individuals from the fear of
violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.” 96 The first two of these interests
are importantly different from the third. The first two concern effects of

94

See supra note 4.
See United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc), aff’d on reh’g,
438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
96
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). The Court offered these reasons in the context of
illustrating the thought that it is acceptable to criminalize a subset of unprotected speech
(threats) because of a particularly pronounced concern with the reason that category of
speech is unprotected. One of the examples the Court used to make that point involved
criminalizing threats to the President, saying that “the reasons why threats of violence are
outside the First Amendment . . . have special force when applied to the person of the
President.” Id.
95
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threats directed at persons who feel threatened. Someone who threatens
others and causes them to feel afraid or to disrupt their lives to avoid the
threat has completed the harm by communicating his threat to his victims.
The third is independent of the fear or disruption that might occur if
potential victims know about the threat: it is an interest in protecting people
from the threatened violence itself. With regard to that harm, the threat is
just an indication that the person who makes the threat intends to cause that
violence. The completed harm is not fear or disruption, it is the unlawfullyand violently-caused harm that is threatened. Threat law can help to
prevent that harm if and only if it provides a basis for prosecuting people
for stating their intention to perform unlawful, violent acts. In other words,
it can prevent this third harm only by treating threats as a species of
inchoate crime.
Of course, the first two harms can also ground inchoate crimes. An
actor could not only culpably cause fear or disruption, he could also attempt
to cause them, or recklessly or negligently act in a way that imposed too
great a risk that they would be caused. The important divide, therefore, is
not between the completed crime and the inchoate crime. It is between the
effect that those crimes, if completed, would have: fear or disruption, or
violently- and unlawfully-caused harm.
One might suggest that the state’s interest in avoiding violently- and
unlawfully-caused harm is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for the crime of
making threats. That is, one might suggest that it is merely a supplemental
interest the state has in preventing threats, paradigmatically understood. At
least one case, however, United States v. Patillo, 97 treats this interest as one
that can support a conviction for threats without the paradigmatic interests
being implicated, and I argue below that this case was right to do so. Thus,
the doctrine needs to be designed to accommodate this most inchoate of
crimes.
To properly accommodate these different concerns, the law should
distinguish four different threat crimes: three concerning fear and
disruption, and one concerning the ultimately threatened harm. Each of
these would have its own appropriate mens rea. All would involve
knowingly making a statement and communicating it to others, but other
mens rea standards would vary between the different crimes.
First, paradigmatic threats, which cause fear or disruption, should have
a mens rea requirement of either knowledge that the statement would likely
cause those harms, or a negligence standard that would make the statement
culpable if a reasonable person would know that the statement would likely
97
431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc), aff’d on reh’g, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en
banc).
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cause those harms. If one were particularly concerned with protecting free
speech, one would have reason to favor the stronger knowledge
requirement, or even require a specific intent to cause those harms; 98 if one
were more concerned with preventing victims from feeling threatened, one
would favor using a negligence standard instead.99
Second, attempted threats would cover those cases in which an actor
intends to cause fear and disruption in his victim, but fails to do so. There
are two ways an actor could fail to cause these harms. First, his victim
could be impervious to the threat. Imagine a case in which A communicates
what he thinks will be threatening to B, and B says: “Are you trying to
threaten me? Well, you don’t scare me.” If A was trying to threaten B, but
B is not scared, then A has attempted to threaten B. This is perfectly
analogous to A trying to kill B by poisoning him, but failing to kill him
because B is not susceptible to the poison that A used. Second, the failure
could concern transmission of the threat. If the actor communicates the
threat to a third party, or uses some medium like the mails, intending that it
reach his ultimate victim, but the threat is not passed on or delivered, then
the agent has attempted to threaten his victim. The mens rea in either kind
of attempt would be, as with nearly all attempt crimes, 100 the specific intent
to threaten. In other words, the mens rea would entail the actor intending
that his threat be communicated to his victim and that his victim be scared
as a result.
Third, negligent threatening would cover those cases in which an agent
communicates a message that is objectively threatening to someone else,
and expects or should expect it to reach his intended victim, causing fear or
disruption, but it does not in fact reach his intended victim. 101 This is a

98
As I explain in greater detail in the next subsection, Justices Marshall and Douglas, in
their concurring opinion in Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975), take the stronger
position, “that the speaker intended his statement to be taken as a threat,” i.e., that he had the
specific intent to threaten.
99
I have in mind a double negligence standard, looking to both reasonable speakers and
reasonable listeners. Most courts that adopt a negligence standard impose a reasonableness
standard on only one side. See Crane, supra note 3, at 1243–48 (discussing reasonable
speaker, reasonable listener, and “reasonable neutral” tests).
100
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 391 (5th ed. 2009). But see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2010) (linking the mens rea of attempt with that of the
completed crime); see also Reilly v. State, 55 P.3d 1259 (Wyo. 2002); Brown v. State, 790
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2001); People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986) (all allowing
convictions for attempt based on recklessness).
101
I assume that this crime, being an inchoate crime would merge with the completed
crime, as all inchoate crimes except for conspiracy do. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 674 (8th ed 2007).
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crime akin to reckless or negligent endangerment,102 the difference being
that the harm is fear and disruption, not bodily harm. The mens rea
requirement should be knowingly making a statement that a reasonable
person would expect to both reach his intended victim and cause fear and
disruption if and when it does so.
These first three crimes, being concerned with causing fear or
disruption, should not require the actor to intend to follow through on the
threat. The actor can cause these harms without intending to cause the
ultimately threatened harm. 103 He can cause fear or disruption just as well
by faking the intention to cause the ultimate harm as by actually having it.
The fourth crime, however, is different on this last point. It is
concerned, not with causing fear or disruption in the intended victims of the
threat, but with the ultimate harm associated with the threatened violence.
To avoid making this a crime of merely being a danger to others—i.e., to
retain some actus reus element—it is necessary to conceive of it as
involving a choice to act. Therefore, it is necessary to understand this
version of the crime as an inchoate crime: choosing to intend to commit the
threatened harm and communicating that intention to others. In other
words, this version of threat crime should be distinguished as the crime of
stating the intention to unlawfully and violently harm others. And the mens
rea for this crime, unlike the other three, has to include having the intention
to cause the threatened harm.
To the best of my knowledge, no case or commentator has
distinguished these four crimes before. As mentioned above, 104 at least one
individual case shows some awareness of the need to make the fundamental
distinction between threats that focus on fear and disruption and threats that
focus on the ultimate harm. But others do not mark any of these
distinctions and try to find one mens rea that fits them all. The result is an
incoherent doctrine of true threats. I now survey a set of cases to illustrate
both points.
2. Cases: Nuanced and Confused
The first case to frame the issue of true threats was Watts v. United
States. 105 The case involved someone who said at a political rally
protesting the draft: “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want

102

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985) (Recklessly Endangering Another Person).
Justice Marshall correctly notes this in Rogers, 422 U.S. at 47 (“[D]efendant is
subject to prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a threat,
regardless of the speaker’s intention.”).
104
See supra text accompanying note 95.
105
394 U.S. 705 (1969).
103
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to get in my sights is L.B.J.” 106 On that basis, he was tried for threatening
the President. The Supreme Court held that his motion for acquittal at the
end of the prosecution’s case should have been granted because his
statement, taken in context, was constitutionally protected political
hyperbole, not a true threat. In the course of coming to that conclusion, the
Court also expressed “grave doubts” that the statutory “willfulness”
requirement required the defendant to intend to commit the crime. 107
Otherwise, it did not engage in any discussion of the required mens rea for
a true threat.
The next important case to discuss true threats was Roy v. United
States, which came up that same year. 108 The defendant in that case used a
pay phone to tell the operator that he would kill the President if he came the
next day, as he was planning to do, to the army base where the defendant
was then stationed. The Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction for threatening
the President, and interpreted the statutory “knowingly and willfully” mens
rea element
to require only that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take
the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of mistake, duress, or
109
coercion.

In other words, the court adopted a negligence standard of the sort that
would be appropriate for a crime as grave as threatening the President. And
taking a cue from the Supreme Court’s grave doubts, the court rejected the
thought that the speaker had to actually intend to carry out the threat,
because that would “eviscerate the statute of its intended effect,”110 namely
preventing people from making statements that “have a restrictive effect
upon the free exercise of Presidential responsibilities.” 111
In adopting this negligence standard, the Roy court showed that it was
concerned with preventing the harms associated with paradigmatic threats,
in particular, having the President’s schedule disrupted to avoid or
otherwise deal with the threat. It failed, however, to distinguish completed
threats, attempted threats, and negligent incomplete threats. And it failed to
consider whether the prosecution should have to prove—given that this
defendant’s threat, like most threats to the President, did not actually disrupt
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 706.
Id. at 708.
416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878 n.15.
Id. at 877.
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his schedule—that the defendant had a specific intent to threaten. It simply
assumed that the core crime is one that should be handled with a negligence
standard, rather than a knowledge or specific intent standard. Nonetheless,
recognizing that the purpose of the statute criminalizing threats to the
President is primarily to prevent disruption of his activities, it properly
rejected requiring that the defendant intend to carry out the threat.
Marking an important distinction from Roy, the Fourth Circuit, shortly
afterward in its en banc decision in United States v. Patillo, 112 did require
specific intent to harm the President. The defendant in that case made two
comments to a fellow security guard at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard that he
intended to kill the President. The court held
that where, as in Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of the President is
uttered without communication to the President intended, the threat can form a basis
for conviction under the terms of [18 U.S.C.] Section 871(a) [making it a federal
crime to threaten the President] only if made with a present intention to do injury to
the President. 113

In other words, the court quite reasonably distinguished cases in which
the threat could be expected to cause fear or disruption from cases in which
it could not. In the former, the defendant need not intend to carry out the
threat, but in the latter, the only government interest served by the statute is
protecting the President, and that interest is triggered only if the defendant
intends to carry out his threat. As the court noted, “[t]here is no danger to
the President’s safety from one who utters a threat and has no intent to
actually do what he threatens.”114
Despite the fact that these two cases—Patillo and Roy—were
explicitly held to be consistent by the Fourth Circuit, 115 the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Rogers v. United States to “resolve an apparent conflict
among the Courts of Appeals concerning the elements of the offense
proscribed by [18 U.S.C.] § 871(a).” 116 The “apparent” circuit split was
between, on the one hand, the Roy court’s use of an objective
reasonableness standard, and, on the other hand, the Patillo court’s use of a
subjective intent standard. 117 The Court decided the case on other grounds,
but Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas, took the occasion to say
that he would “interpret § 871 to require proof that the speaker intended his
112

431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
Id. at 297–98.
114
Id. at 298.
115
The Fourth Circuit reconsidered and then affirmed its prior decision in United States
v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc). In doing so, the court explicitly held that
its holding was consistent with Roy. Id at 15.
116
422 U.S. 35, 36 (1975).
117
See id. at 43 n.1 (listing cases and circuits).
113
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statement to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually
Justice Marshall’s concern was in large part
carrying it out.” 118
constitutional: the deterrence effect of the statute, on an objective
reasonableness interpretation, would cause people to be too cautious about
what they say, lest their words be interpreted as a threat even if they are not
meant as one. This “would have substantial costs in discouraging the
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate that the First Amendment is
intended to protect.” 119 To avoid that effect, Marshall would have
eliminated the crime of negligent, incomplete threats, reducing the number
of threat crimes to two: complete threats and attempted threats, both with
the same basic mens rea of specific intent to threaten.
It is noteworthy that the Rogers Court failed to recognize the
reasonable distinction that the Fourth Circuit drew between Patillo and Roy.
And while Justice Marshall’s concern with protecting free speech is
reasonable when it comes to paradigmatic threats, the essence of which is
causing fear or disruption, he lost sight of the point the Fourth Circuit was
making regarding threats that do “not involve the communication, or
attempted communication, by a defendant of his threat to the President.”120
Moreover, he overlooked the possibility that a knowledge requirement—
knowing or believing that the words used would be taken as a threat—
would protect the First Amendment values he wanted to protect as well as
the requirement of a specific intent to threaten. This failure reflects his
failure to distinguish completed threats from attempted threats. And this
failure to recognize basic distinctions was a sign of things to come. 121
After the Rogers Court failed to embrace Justice Marshall’s position
on the specific intent to threaten, circuit courts generally used some version
of an objective test for all threats, not just threats against the President. 122
The main split that evolved after Rogers was between different versions of
objective standards. The Ninth Circuit in Roy used a reasonable speaker
test, and many other circuits followed suit. 123 The Fourth Circuit, however,
led a number of other courts in adopting the reasonable listener standard,

118

Id. at 48.
Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964)).
120
United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
121
This failure to recognize the different kinds of threats and the different, arguably
reasonable mens rea requirements is also reflected in the secondary literature. See, e.g., G.
Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829 (2002); Crane, supra note 3, at 1239.
122
See Crane, supra note 3, at 1243 nn.76–77 (collecting cases). One exceptional case
was United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring specific intent to
threaten when threatening someone other than the President).
123
See Crane, supra note 3, at 1244–46 (collecting cases).
119
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according to which a case can be submitted to a jury if “there is substantial
evidence that tends to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary,
reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter (or
message) would interpret it as a threat of injury.” 124
The Supreme Court again stepped into this narrow dispute in Virginia
v. Black, 125 a case involving defendants who were prosecuted for violating
Virginia’s ban on burning a cross with the intent to intimidate. The Court
held that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim (or victims) in fear of
bodily harm or death.” 126 And it held that “[t]rue threats encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” 127 The phrase “the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”
suggests that the Court was adopting Justice Marshall’s specific intent to
threaten condition for true threats. 128 And thus, it might have seemed that
the Court was trying to clarify the nature of “true threats,” unprotected by
the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the Court’s decision has only added to a sense of
confusion. First, the word “encompass” is ambiguous. Does it imply that
only speech acts that involve the specific intent to threaten can be treated as
true threats, or that those as well as some other acts constitute the full
universe of true threats? Second, the case involved intimidation, which is a
paradigmatic form of threat in which the victim is expected to experience
fear. But did the Court mean to limit its discussion of the relevant mens rea
to only those paradigmatic cases? Immediately after seemingly adopting
Justice Marshall’s specific intent-to-threaten test, the Court said that the
“speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”129 But then it
quoted all three purposes for criminalizing threats mentioned in R.A.V.,
including “protecting people from the possibility that the threatened
124

United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). Other circuits that
followed this lead, including the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. See Crane,
supra note 3, at 1246 nn.96–99 (collecting cases). The difference between the tests is that in
the reasonable listener tests the objective standard becomes a jurisdictional test (whether the
case can go to the jury), and the State has to prove only one mens rea element: knowingly
making the statement. See Crane, supra note 3, at 1246–47. It is not clear what difference
this would make in practice.
125
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
126
Id. at 360.
127
Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
129
Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
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violence will occur.” 130 Thus, one could take the Black Court’s mens rea
standard to apply to all threats, even mere statements of the intention to
commit violent acts.
This confusion is both noted and replicated by the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Parr, 131 a case involving a defendant who was convicted of
threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against a federal
government building, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. First, with regard
to what the Supreme Court meant in Black, the Parr court noted that “some
circuits have held that a statement qualifies as a true threat only if the
speaker subjectively intended it as a threat.”132 But it also noted that “[n]ot
all courts have agreed that Black changed the test for true threats,”133 and
that “[i]t is possible that the Court was not attempting a comprehensive
redefinition of true threats in Black; the plurality’s discussion of threat
doctrine was very brief.” 134 It then ducked the issue on the ground that it
did not need to be resolved in Parr’s case.
The confusion replicated in Parr concerns the failure to make a host of
important distinctions. Parr communicated his threat to his cellmate in a
Wisconsin prison, who then reported it to authorities.135 There is no reason
to believe that Parr wanted or expected his cellmate to communicate the
threat to anyone else. Thus, this was not a paradigmatic threat in which the
government had any interest in protecting people from fear or disruption.
The government’s only interest was in preventing the ultimate crime. In
other words, the only criminal act Parr could have committed is that of
stating his intention to commit a terrorist act. But the court did not take this
as reason to require a specific intent to commit that ultimate act. Seemingly
unaware of the decision in Patillo, the court simply cited Black for the
proposition that “the government is not required to prove that the defendant
in a threat case intended . . . to carry out his threats.” 136 In a similarly
sweeping way, it held that a “threat doesn’t need to be communicated
directly to its victim. . . .” 137 In so saying, it ignored the difference between
130

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008).
132
Id. at 499.
133
Id. at 499 n.2.
134
Id. at 500.
135
Id. at 494.
136
Id. at 498.
137
Id. at 497. I am aware of only one other case, one outside the federal courts, which
upheld a conviction for threatening when it was the defendant did not intend the threat to be
communicated to a potential victim. Beard v. United States, 535 A.2d 1373, 1377–78 (D.C.
1988) (upholding a conviction for threatening a juror despite the contention that the
defendant did not intend for that juror to know of the threat). This case too did not examine
the significance of making a non-paradigmatic threat, but it backed away from a clear
131
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communicating to a third party who would be expected to convey the threat
to its victim and communicating to a third party who would not.
In sum, with Parr, we have come to a state in which the true threats
doctrine is so muddled that courts no longer even recognize the distinctions
that they are failing to make. While being uncertain about whether to use a
specific intent-to-threaten standard, they have lost their sense that there are
really four different crimes that count as true threats. Indeed, the courts
have never paid attention to the differences between the first three crimes:
completed paradigmatic threats, attempted paradigmatic threats, and
recklessly or negligently communicating words that could reasonably be
taken to be paradigmatic threats. Just by noticing those differences, much
of the current confusion about the need for a specific intent-to-threaten test
could be cleared up. But the difference that was once noticed between these
paradigmatic threat crimes and the inchoate crime of stating the intention to
commit unlawful, violent acts has now been lost. This is the more
important difference, as this latter crime cannot reasonably require anything
less than the intention to commit such violent acts. If the defendant had no
such intention, then he cannot be charged with an inchoate crime connected
to performing those acts.
In what follows, I leave to the side the dispute about the appropriate
mens rea for paradigmatic threats and focus instead on defending the
thought that there should be another kind of threat crime: the inchoate crime
of stating the intention to commit unlawful, violent crimes.
B. MAKING SENSE OF THE INCHOATE CRIME OF STATING THE
INTENTION TO COMMIT UNLAWFUL, VIOLENT CRIMES

Inchoate crimes are a controversial set of crimes. Many have been
concerned that they really amount to punishing dangerousness, rather than
wrongful choices. 138 The crime of stating the intention to commit unlawful,
violent crimes, being the ultimate inchoate crime, makes those worries all
the stronger. Nonetheless, I will argue here that those worries can be
properly addressed. I do so in three steps. First, I spell out how this crime
is like the classic inchoate crimes of attempt and conspiracy, which, when
properly interpreted, do not merely penalize dangerousness but also
wrongful choices. Second, I try to clarify when it makes sense to
holding that a crime is committed if no one feels threatened, ending the discussion of the
communication of a threat by noting that the defendant “ha[d] reason to believe the hearer
[of his threat, another juror] will be upset or intimidated.” Id. at 1378.
138
See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN (WITH STEPHEN MORSE),
CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 199 (2009); Morse, supra note 26, at
287–89; see also Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 425, 434–35 (2007).
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criminalize mere statements of intent—paradigmatically when one is stating
one’s intention to perform a terrorist act that aims to cause death and
destruction on a large scale, while being motivated by the kind of extremist
ideology that motivates members of al Qaeda—and when the actor must
have done more to acquire criminal liability. Third, I address some basic
questions about the nature of the intention—how specific and how
unconditional it must be—if the Government is to obtain a conviction. In
the next section, I turn to responding to the objection that this crime is too
far along the inchoate spectrum.
1. A Crime like Other Inchoate Crimes
The basic thought behind the crime of stating the intention to commit
unlawful, violent acts, in particular terrorist acts, is that intentions are not
mere thoughts; they are choices that one makes with regard to how one will
behave. 139 Making such choices is the fundamental crime targeted by all
notions of inchoate crime in which the person has not yet done anything
that would constitute a completed crime. All inchoate crimes require some
external act that provides evidence of the intention,140 but statements can
fill that role in the same way that a substantial step operates in attempt
crimes and agreement operates in conspiracies.
This position on inchoate crimes presupposes the validity of the
subjectivist model of criminal liability. This model, which fundamentally
informs the Model Penal Code, 141 holds that the paradigmatic core of
criminal liability is the choice to form, and act on, intentions that flout the
law. 142 Obviously the set of restrictions on behavior imposed by the
criminal law has to be concerned with more than mere intentions; it has to
be concerned, most fundamentally, with preventing people from unjustly
causing harms to others. But when it comes to explaining how an actor can
be liable for committing a crime, the subjectivist focus on intentions makes

139

See generally MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (1987)
(describing a planning conception of intentions); see also ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN,
supra note 138, at 200–01; Alec Walen, The Doctrine of Illicit Intentions, 34 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 39, 47 (2006).
140
This is true, at least, of the classic inchoate crimes: attempt, conspiracy, and
solicitation. It is arguably not true of another class of crimes that are like these inchoate
crimes in being anticipatory, that is, in not involving a harm in themselves but in aiming to
prevent harms: possession crimes. See Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2437 (2007).
141
See DRESSLER, supra note 100, at 385.
142
Dressler mistakenly represents the core concern of subjectivists as being
“dangerousness and bad character.” Id. These are not choices, and they may not be the basis
for punishment.
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more sense than an objectivist focus on causing harms. This becomes most
clear when examining inchoate crimes.
The objectivist can say that an inchoate crime causes harm by
“‘disturbing the public repose,’ . . . or by causing apprehension, fear or
alarm in the community because the actor has patently ‘set out to do serious
damage . . . and to break the accepted rules of social life.’” 143 But the harm
caused by any individual inchoate crime so pales in comparison to the
harms of completed crimes, especially when the potential victim does not
learn of the attempt, that the liability for these harms would, if harm is the
basis for liability, be trivial.144 If we want to make sense of the thought that
inchoate crimes like attempted murder are serious crimes, even if the victim
never knows about it, then we need to understand liability in a subjectivist
way, as attaching to the criminal intent. This is not to deny that criminal
effects are also relevant to the degree of culpability an actor has.145 It is
instead to say that the fundamental basis for culpability is the decision to
pursue a criminal aim. Causing unjust harms if one completes a crime
merely compounds that liability. 146
If criminal intentions are the basis for criminal liability, then what is
the relevance of an act in pursuit of them? In short, it is primarily
epistemic: it confirms that the person has adopted the criminal intention.
As William Blackstone put it:
For though, in foro conscientiae, a fixed design or will to do an unlawful act is almost
as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart,
or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by
147
outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know.

Or, as George Fletcher put it, in the context of inchoate crimes, an act “is
important [only] so far as it verifies the firmness of the [actor’s] intent.” 148
This verification has two components. On the one hand, people other than
the actor cannot possibly know his intentions until he has manifested them
in some way, in action or in speech. On the other hand, equally important if
143
See DRESSLER, supra note 100, at 386 (quoting Clark v. State, 8 S.W. 145, 147 (Tenn.
1888); Thomas Weigend, Why Lady Eldon Should Be Acquitted: The Social Harm in
Attempting the Impossible, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 264 (1977)).
144
The crime for which Parr was convicted carried a ten-year sentence—hardly trivial—
and that was after the judge sentenced him to a below-Guidelines term. United States v.
Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 2008).
145
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 138, at ch. 5, do deny that effects are relevant to
the degree of culpability. I reject their arguments for this conclusion in Alec Walen, Crime,
Culpability and Moral Luck, 29 LAW & PHIL. 373 (2010).
146
See Walen, supra note 145 (defending the last claim that actual harm compounds
liability).
147
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
148
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 138 (1978).
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often overlooked, it is necessary to distinguish mere thoughts, and in
particular fantasies about how one might want to act, from sincerely
adopted intentions. 149
The law may not criminalize mere fantasies. To allow freedom of
conscience, 150 the state has to allow people to make whatever value
judgments they want to make about any acts—even criminal acts. They can
fantasize about committing whatever crimes appeal to them. They are
limited only in what they decide to do. This crucial distinction between
values and fantasies on the one side, and decisions regarding actions on the
other, is marked by the choice to form an intention. Yet it is not always
easy to distinguish intentions from mere fantasies. Indeed, it may be hard
for an actor to be certain whether he has really formed an intention to do
something criminal until he has in some way started to act on the intention.
Thus, the act requirement serves not only to provide external evidence of
what an actor intends, it also serves to distinguish a sincere and firm
intention from a fantasy.
Of course, a single act or statement could reflect many things other
than a sincere or firm intention to commit a criminal act. In the attempt
context, one might engage in acts preparatory to a crime, such as buying a
gun, only as a way of indulging a fantasy with no intention of carrying out
the crime. One might even go further towards the completion of a crime
just to experience a frisson of excitement as the completion comes near,
again without any intention of completing the crime. Likewise, in the
conspiracy context, one might make statements indicating that one intends
to partake in a criminal enterprise without sincerely intending to do so,
effectively making a false promise to the other members of the conspiracy.
And one might make a statement of one’s intention to commit a crime,
outside the context of an agreement that is not a true threat but is instead a
joke of some sort, or an expression of bravado or rage.
All of these possibilities raise the real worry that a conviction for an
inchoate crime is a false positive—a conviction for adopting a criminal
intention when the actor has done no such thing. But false positives are
always a worry in criminal law. All one can demand of acts is that they
corroborate having a sincere and firm intention.151 The rest of the work
necessary to establish that a person has indeed formed a sincere and firm
149

One might trace this concern with distinguishing real intents from fantasies back to
Gerald Dworkin & David Blumenfeld, Punishment for Intentions, 75 MIND 396, 401 (1966).
150
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1939) (stating that the First
Amendment freedom of religion includes freedom of conscience).
151
But see the Model Penal Code on attempt, requiring that the substantial steps be
“strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)
(1985).
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intention has to come from the context in which the acts are performed and
the background character of the actor. If the question is whether an actor’s
substantial step towards the completion of a crime was merely a form of
play, then knowing whether he engages in such play regularly is relevant.
And so is knowing what he has said to others, and what possible motives he
may have had in doing so. These are difficult issues, but they are handled
on a regular basis in prosecution of attempt crimes and conspiracies. 152
Relying on a statement as opposed to a substantial step or an agreement
raises no new difficulty. 153
One might object that I misrepresent the essence of inchoate crimes as
the formation of a criminal intention. Joshua Dressler, for example,
describes the formation of the intention as simply the mens rea of inchoate
crimes, saying that there is no crime until there is also an actus reus. His
reason for saying this is that the alternative is to punish someone for
“thoughts alone.” 154 He makes the point in the context of describing a sixstage sequence for the commission of a completed crime:
First, the actor conceives the idea of committing a crime. Second, she evaluates the
idea, in order to determine if she should proceed. Third, she fully forms the intention
to go forward. Fourth, she prepares to commit the crime, for example, by obtaining
any instruments necessary for its commission. Fifth, she commences commission of
the offense. Sixth, she completes her actions, thereby achieving her immediate
criminal goal. 155

This is a useful model for the commission of a completed crime, and
Dressler is surely right that attempt liability attaches only at stage five. But
he would be wrong if he were to suggest (he never says this explicitly) that
this is the stage at which there first arises a potential actus reus. Clearly
there is action even at stage four. But more to the point, there is choice to
engage in action at stage three. Punishment for mere thought—the having
and entertaining of ideas, the weighing of reasons, the experiencing of
emotions, sensations, and perceptions—would occur only if people were
punished for their mental activity in stages one or two.
To be clear, I am not saying that the law can criminalize any and every
form of choice. One can choose, by directing one’s attention one way or

152
See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (1967) (discussing many reasons
why intent might or might not be found in a conspiracy case). But see the critical discussion
of this case in KADISH, SCHULHOFER & STEIKER, supra note 101, at 700.
153
See GLANVILLE LLEWELYN WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 630 (2d
ed. 1961) (discussing the ambiguity of acts unaccompanied by statements, and the more
reliable information, for the purposes of establishing mens rea, provided by a confession of a
guilty intention).
154
DRESSLER, supra note 100, at 379.
155
Id.
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another, whether to have certain kinds of thoughts as well as whether to
take actions. The freedom of thought must include the freedom to choose
to indulge any thoughts one wants to indulge. My point is that the law can
criminalize choosing to form an intention to pursue a criminal plan of
action without criminalizing mere thought. If the completed action would
be criminal, the law can criminalize the choice to take such an action, and
that choice is what one makes when one forms the intention to do so.156
It is also important to be clear that I am not suggesting anything that
comes close to the model of policing represented in the Minority Report, 157
that of predicting criminality and punishing on the basis of that prediction.
What I am calling for is criminalizing a choice to engage in criminal
conduct. Of course if such choices had no bearing on the commission of
criminal acts, then it would be pointless to criminalize them. But there is an
intrinsic connection between forming an intention and going on to perform
the intended actions; intentions function to guide us.158 The connection is
not perfect; intentions can always be revised or renounced.159 Even so, one
can have no legitimate reason to set oneself to the task of performing
criminal acts. One might have legitimate reason to pretend to perform
criminal acts, or to intend to perform many of the preparatory acts that
would normally lead to a criminal act—one might, for example, want to
understand, for constructive purposes, just how easy it is to be in position to
complete a criminal act. But assuming the criminal law is just and that one
has a duty to obey just laws, 160 then one should not intend to complete a
criminal act.

156

Connecting this with the AR model discussed in Part III, one can be punitively
detained on that model if one has autonomously chosen to commit a crime. The choice to
frame and act on an intention to engage in a crime is just such a choice.
157
MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2002).
158
See BRATMAN, supra note 139, at 27 (stating that intentions “are conduct-controlling
pro-attitudes, they have inertia, and they serve as inputs into further practical reasoning”).
159
Id. at 24 (stating that “unless and until I do give up or reconsider my prior intention,
its role in my means-ends reasoning will be to set an end for that reasoning, . . . ” implying
that one can give up or reconsider one’s intentions).
160
This is of course a controversial assertion. It may be true for crimes that are malum in
se. But for crimes that are malum prohibitum, or even for crimes that some believe are
malum in se but which others think should not be criminal act at all, the basis for having a
duty to avoid committing those crimes would have to turn on a political account of the duty
to respect legitimate law. For one influential view of that, see JOHN RAWLS, THE IDEA OF
PUBLIC REASON REVISITED, reprinted in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 137 (1999) (“[L]egitimate
law°.°.°. may not be thought the most reasonable, or the most appropriate, by each, but it is
politically (morally) binding on him or her as a citizen and is to be accepted as such.”). For
a friendly critique of this position, see Alec Walen, Reasonable Illegal Force: Justice and
Legitimacy in a Pluralistic, Liberal Society, 111 ETHICS 344 (2001).
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Importantly, what matters in an individual case is not whether, having
formed such an intention, one is so likely to perform the act that one has to
be preventively stopped. That is, the concern with intentions is not simply a
concern with a more or less reliable mechanism for making predictions of
later criminality. What matters in forming a criminal intention is that one
has already chosen to flout the law. Any punishment would then be for that
criminal act, performed in the past.
If the choice to intend to do something criminal is the core of any
inchoate offense, then one might ask: Why criminalize only statements at a
stage earlier than Dressler’s fifth stage of commencing the commission of
the crime? In other words, if statements can be a sufficiently reliable
indicator of a criminal intention after stage three—the adoption of the
criminal intention—why not also punish on the basis of other, nonverbal
behavior, such as preparatory action at stage four, which is indicative of
having formed the intention to commit a crime?
I can give no satisfying categorical answer, but I can point out that
nonverbal actions that do not fall into category five are very likely to be
equivocal. Without an accompanying statement to show that they are in
pursuit of a criminal intention, it is hard to judge that someone has, beyond
a reasonable doubt, started to act on a criminal intention. 161 Indeed, the line
between stages four and five is inherently vague. What really marks the
line is that acts in stage four can easily be given a benign interpretation,
whereas acts in stage five more often cannot. (Consider, for example, the
difference between buying a gun and tracking down an intended victim
while carrying the gun.) Statements, which may be offered well before the
actor’s actions reach stage five, may clarify an actor’s intention in ways that
mere behavior cannot.
2. Breadth of the Crime of Stating a Criminal Intent
The logic of this subpart up to this point might seem to justify
prosecuting actors for stating their intention to engage in any criminal
actions, not just terrorism. But there is a balance to be struck between, on
the one hand, respect for freedom and avoidance of an overly intrusive
police state, and, on the other hand, the need to prevent seriously harmful
acts that would otherwise be hard to prevent. This balance calls for limiting
the crime of stating one’s criminal intent to a narrow range of completed

161
This problem exists even if the crime is complete; acts often do not speak for
themselves. See WILLIAMS, supra note 153. Nonetheless, the further down the line of
Dressler’s six steps a person has gone, the more likely it is that her actions will at least be
strongly corroborative of one intent over another.
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crimes for which the harm is great and deterrence is unlikely to work;
crimes like terrorism.
The reason not to make this crime too broad is grounded in the basic
importance of liberty, including the liberty to do immoral but not harmful
things. This is not just a point about the state not taking sides in reasonable
disagreements about religious ideals or other conceptions of a good life. 162
It is a point about the state recognizing that some wrongs are personal in a
way that makes it inappropriate for the state to get involved. Because of
this respect for individual liberty, the state should generally be reluctant to
punish. It should punish only when the need for doing so, in terms of
preventing unjust harms and upholding the integrity law, is high. 163
Flouting the law is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient reason for
punishment, 164 again assuming the law is just. 165
To illustrate the point that not all wrongs should be covered by the
criminal law, consider marital infidelity. Quite often such acts inflict real
harms; nevertheless, the personal intimacies that would have to be explored
to decide what sort of punishment an unfaithful spouse deserves are the
kinds of concerns that do not fit well into a prosecutor’s portfolio, at least,
not in a liberal society. This is not to say that courts have no role in
adjudicating marital matters, but their role should be limited to tasks like
facilitating an equitable divorce, if matters come to that point, and ensuring
that children are not abused, rather than punishing one party for failing to
live up to her marital commitments. Likewise, statements of criminal
intentions ought normally to be left in the private sphere. Again, this is not
to deny that the underlying intentions are morally wrong. It is to say that
they are far enough from leading to harm, and are part of what is normally
considered the private realm of life—planning how to live—that the proper
rebuke for publicly adopting a criminal intention should normally be social,
not criminal. 166
162

See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213–20
(1993).
163
For a similar view on the need to be sparing in the use of criminal law, see DOUGLAS
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 92–103 (2008) (arguing
for what I would call a pro tanto right not to be punished).
164
This view on flouting the law supports what is sometimes known as weak
retributivism. See Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the
Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 698 (1994) (distinguishing strong and weak
retributivism).
165
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
166
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 72–73 (David Spitz ed., W. W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859) (discussing the propriety of responding to vice by forming an unfavorable
opinion of those who have it, rather than by intentionally punishing them; the former has as
its natural consequence the loss of valuable social status and opportunities on the part of
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One might think that another reason not to criminalize statements of
the intent to commit a crime is that it becomes harder to prove that someone
really would commit a completed crime the further he is from committing
it. As Robert Chesney put the point:
The farther that one moves from the paradigm of a completed act—as one moves
backwards successively through attempt, to advanced planning, to initial planning,
and so forth—the more tenuous the link between the defendant and the anticipated
harm becomes and, hence, the more likely it is that false positives will be
167
generated.

There are, however, two reasons why this is not a good reason to limit
the crime. First, it presupposes the objectivist position rejected above—that
the only real crime is causing an unjust harm. Indeed, Chesney’s way of
putting things, in terms of a link between the defendant and the anticipated
harm, makes it seem that prosecutions for inchoate crimes are really just
attempts to predict who will commit a crime. If that were what inchoate
crime prosecutions were about, they would be a variation on the theme from
Minority Report. 168 The state cannot justly punish for a crime that has not
been committed.169 If the fundamental crime is forming a criminal intent,
however, then there can be no false positives if the agent has indeed formed
such an intention. Of course, he might not go on to commit the completed
crime, but that does not mean that he has not already acted wrongly.
Second, there may, of course, be false positives with regard to the
claim that an actor has formed a criminal intention, but that does not mean
that the risk of false convictions has to be unusually high. Even if it is
harder to be certain that an actor has formed a criminal intention the more
inchoate his crime, that means only that the supporting evidence has to be
that much stronger. It does not mean that we ought to allow the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to be relaxed the further the inchoate
crime is from a completed crime. And if the standard of proof remains the
same, then there is no reason to think that there will be more false positives
the more inchoate a crime is.
The reason to limit the crime of stating the intention to commit a
crime, then, is that forming intentions is presumptively part of the private

those who are thought of as vicious, but when such a loss is not intentionally created to
punish, it can be more easily justified).
167
Chesney, supra note 138, at 435.
168
See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 157.
169
While that proposition may seem trivially true, it has been contested. See Christopher
New, Time and Punishment, 52 ANALYSIS 35 (1992); Daniel Statman, The Time to Punish
and the Problem of Moral Luck, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 129 (1997). For replies, see Saul
Smilansky, A Time to Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50 (1994), and Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way
Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 388–91 (2008).
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sphere of life that the state should not regulate with the criminal law. What
weighs on the other side, in exceptional cases, is the seriousness of the harm
and the inability of the threat of criminal punishment to deter certain
potential criminals from committing their intended crimes.
Crimes are at their most serious when they threaten a whole
community, such as genocide, or when they inflict large-scale death and
destruction. They are still very serious when they victimize only a few or
even one person, but inflict the most serious harms on those persons:
permanent and severe harm (physical or mental) or death. Crimes are
essentially impossible to deter when the would-be perpetrator would rather
accept the punishment, or even death, than fail to inflict the harm he wants
to inflict. 170 Such crimes arise when the motive is not economic gain but
some overwhelming desire, such as an unyielding thirst for revenge or
extremist convictions, like those found in some with extremist religious or
political beliefs.
Given these two positive factors, stating one’s intention to perform a
terrorist act that aims to cause death and destruction on a large scale, while
being motivated by the kind of extremist ideology that motivates members
of al Qaeda, would be the paradigmatic criminal act of stating one’s
intention to commit a further crime. Other complete crimes that might fit
this mold would be political crimes like assassination of leading
government figures, especially the President. And given that death is
intended in other cases, one could at least argue for extending the crime to
threats against the lives of non-public individuals, at least when the person
making the threat cares more about causing harm than about any possible
punishment—as all too often seems to be the case when a jealous and
vengeful domestic or former domestic partner decides that he would rather
be dead or in jail than see his partner or former partner move on with her
life. 171
It is worth noting that this question of breadth could also be asked of
other inchoate crimes. Why should all attempted crimes count as crimes?
Perhaps it is easy enough to see why all complete but imperfect attempts—
crimes in which the actor has performed the last act needed to complete the
crime, but in some way he missed his target and failed to cause the harm he
170
Slobogin, supra note 32, at 4, argues that people who cannot be deterred for this
reason ought to be preventively detained. But his argument rests on a faulty premise: “that
the person is so lacking in the . . . willingness to adhere to society’s most basic
prohibitions . . . that punishment is not warranted.” Id. at 5. Slobogin confuses the fact that
punishment would have no deterrent effect with the argument that it is unwarranted; it can be
warranted for other reasons, such as retributive and expressive ones.
171
Colman McCarthy, Better Protection for Women in Danger, WASH. POST, June 13,
1992, at A21.
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intended to cause—should be criminal. The actor has not only formed a
criminal intent, he has followed through on it as far as he could. The same
cannot be said of an actor who has taken a substantial step (Dressler’s stage
five), but has not completed his attempt. Perhaps he would decide not to
follow through. 172
It seems to me that the answer can be found in the thought that there is
a continuum of liability from first forming the intention, to starting to act on
it, to completing the plan, to causing the harm. At various crucial junctures,
such as starting to prepare (Dressler’s stage four) and taking substantial
steps (Dressler’s stage five), the actor should reconsider the intention.
Failure to do so compounds his culpability and gives the criminal law more
reason to take an interest in his actions. By stage five, the actor is close
enough to a completed crime that his claim to be operating in a private
space is outweighed by the state’s interest in upholding the integrity of the
law. The really interesting cases should be stage four cases. As noted
above, without a statement clarifying what the preparatory actions mean,
they are too equivocal for grounding a prosecution. 173 But the combination
of a statement of intentions and preparatory actions should arguably justify
criminal prosecutions in a wider range of cases than just a statement or an
action alone. How wide a range I leave for another occasion.
3. Nature of the Intention: How Specific and Unconditional
The main concern for the specificity of an intention is that if it is
sufficiently vague, then there is reason to doubt that it has been sincerely
and firmly adopted. In other words, vague, open-ended plans to commit
terrorist acts are more likely than well-developed plans to be idle fantasies
rather than sincere intentions. It is, of course, impossible to be precise
about just how well developed a plan must be to count as a sincere
intention. But the Parr case provides some seemingly reasonable guidance
on what it takes to act on a “plan [that] was detailed”: 174
He said he planned to construct a bomb inside a delivery truck, park the truck outside
the federal building, and walk inside as if to make a delivery. He explained that he
would briefly enter the building but then would slip outside immediately and run as
175
far as he could before the bomb exploded.

He also “mentioned the number of detonators and drums of explosives
he would use, where he would park, and how he would deflect

172

This is the main concern of ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 138, at 212. It is also
the concern of all who favor the idea of a locus penitentiae.
173
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
174
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2008).
175
Id.
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suspicion.” 176 The court notes that there were some large undefined parts of
his plan. For example, he “did not specify an exact time frame for his plan,
noting that he would be on probation for eight years after his release and
would use that time to ‘refine [his] techniques’ because he would get only
one chance. But he vowed to pull off his plan within ten years.” 177
Altogether, given that “Parr emphasized that he ‘absolutely’ would execute
his plan,” 178 the court had no trouble concluding that Parr sincerely
intended to communicate a threat. It did not address whether this would be
a sufficiently well-defined intention to count as an intention to carry out the
threat—it mistakenly thought that he did not have to intend to carry out the
threat. 179 But the portrait the court paints is of someone whose intention
was sufficiently specific to count as a sincere intention to commit a terrorist
act.
Conditionality allows for some more clear-cut distinctions, but also
presents difficult line-drawing cases. One general distinction in the
criminal law dealing with crimes which require the mens rea of specific
intention is that a conditional intention counts as the full specific intention
“unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense.” 180 On that view, the intent to blow up a
building unless the government accedes to one’s wishes—a conditional
intention because the government might accede to one’s wishes, in which
case one would not blow up the building—counts the same as the
unconditional intention to blow up the building. The condition, far from
negating the evil, trades on it. By contrast, if one intended to blow
something up unless one discovers that it is against the law to do so, that
would not count as the intention to blow something up in a way that
violates the law.
More problematically, what should we say about someone who intends
to blow up a building if he gets the chance? By the formula just described,
he should be treated as if he has the unqualified intention to blow up the
building. But now suppose that the building is in a heavily guarded military
base, and he believes he will have a chance to blow it up only if (a) he is
invited onto the base and (b) the policy of searching people who enter the
base for guns and explosives is discontinued. It seems quite unlikely that
he would ever have a chance, given those conditions, to act on his intention,
and we can suppose that he knows just how unlikely it is. Can it still be
176
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reasonable to say that he should be treated as if he has an unconditional
intention to blow up that building? That seems unreasonable, but how
should we draw the relevant line?
I suggest the following gets at the heart of the core distinction between
intention and fantasy: if the condition is sufficiently likely to arise that the
actor is actively or regularly watching to see if it has arisen, and if he is
ready to act on his illicit intention if the condition does arise, then he should
be treated as if he has the unconditional intention. By actively or regularly
monitoring conditions to determine whether he can at some point act on it,
and by otherwise being prepared to act on it, he is actively engaging it. If,
by contrast, the condition is sufficiently unlikely that he has no need to keep
himself in a state of ready watchfulness, then the intention should be treated
as mere conditional intention. In that case, even if he has behaved
improperly by adopting that conditional intention, he is not sufficiently
engaged by it to be criminally culpable. If and when the condition arises,
he will then have to choose whether to act on the intention. He might well
recant at that time, when he reengages actively with the intention. Until
that time, then, the preference should be for liberty over punishment.
For an illustration, imagine someone who announces that he will attack
U.S. government buildings if the U.S. ever invades Yemen. This is a live
possibility at this time, in mid-2011. But what is his attitude towards the
intention? Does he do anything to prepare himself to attack U.S.
government buildings in anticipation of this possible eventuality? Or does
he just go about his life, waiting passively for news of such an invasion,
without doing anything to prepare for it? If the latter applies, then his threat
should not be taken as a fully formed intention to commit a terrorist act; if
the former applies, then it should.181
C. OBJECTION AND REPLY

In this last subpart, I will entertain the objection that it is improper to
prosecute people for merely forming the intention to commit terrorist acts.
The arguments I address were formulated by Larry Alexander and Kim
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What if the person is in jail and forms the intention to commit a terrorist act if he ever
gets out? There may not be much he can do, beyond dreaming up more or less detailed plans
to act on the intention. In that case, it may turn on whether he can expect to be released or
not. If, like Parr, he expects his imminent release, then his conditional intention should
count as if it were an unconditional one. If he expects never to be released, then his intention
is basically a fantasy. The harder question is what to do with an intention that the person
expects to have a chance to act on, but not for many years. The right answer may then
depend on other factors that show whether the intention is sincerely adopted or allow the
possibility that it is a mere fantasy.
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Ferzan. 182 They start with the same assumption that I accept, namely that
forming an intention is an act in its own right that is potentially culpable.183
But they go on to offer four reasons to conclude that it is not the kind of
culpable act with which the law should be concerned. I respond here to all
four reasons in turn.
1. Distinguishing Intentions from Desires and Fantasies
Alexander and Ferzan argue that it is difficult to distinguish intentions
from desires or fantasies, which are not acts but states of mind.184 I have
already discussed this problem above, 185 but I highlight here the way in
which stating the intention to commit unlawful, violent acts compares with
other inchoate crimes in this regard. Consider, first, how attempt law
addresses this problem. Acting on an intention in a way that takes it nearly
to completion is a good sign that one has adopted an intention, as opposed
to merely feeling a desire or playing with a fantasy. Now consider
conspiracy law. Having to forge an agreement with another focuses the
mind on just what one is really willing to do,186 and thus making an
agreement is another way of testing the sincerity of an intention, and
helping to distinguish it from a mere desire or fantasy. Mere statements by
themselves are a less reliable sign that someone has sincerely adopted an
intention. But the sincerity with which the message is communicated,
whether it is repeated, the context in which it is said, and the person’s
general character all suffice to establish, at least in some cases, that the
intention was sincerely formed. 187
2. The Conditionality of Intentions and the Opacity of Future
Circumstances
Alexander and Ferzan’s second argument concerns the conditionality
of intentions and the opacity of future circumstances. I have just discussed
the issue of conditionality. 188 But Alexander and Ferzan raise a number of
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finer objections, that I have not yet considered, having to do with conditions
that the actor may not yet have considered.189 One such objection concerns
the possibility that an intention that seemed unproblematic would be
problematic if certain unanticipated conditions arise. Their example
concerns someone who is intending to pick up her child from school in ten
minutes. 190 Given the traffic conditions at the start of the drive, she should
be able to do so without driving recklessly. But if she hits a traffic jam, she
may have to speed to get there on time. What is her level of culpability
when she first forms the intention?
I suggest that the answer should depend on whether she has anticipated
this possibility and formed the conditional intention to act impermissibly if
it does arise. If she has formed that conditional intention, then she has
formed an illicit intention. If the harm is serious enough, then acting on this
conditional intention should be criminally culpable. If she has not
anticipated this possibility, however, then the mere disposition to behave
impermissibly cannot be the basis of criminal liability. She has not yet
made a choice to behave impermissibly.
Another problematic example concerns someone who decides to blow
up a football stadium, but has not decided whether to do so when it is full of
people or empty. 191 The magnitude of the threatened crime varies
tremendously depending on whether it is just property or also lives that she
threatens. Given that she has not addressed that issue, how culpable is her
intention?
I suggest that the answer should depend on whether there is reason to
believe that, when putting her plan into action, she would kill innocents. If
she shows a general indifference to the lives of others, or sees some extra
value in killing innocents, then her culpability should be high, perhaps
nearly as high as if she intended to kill innocents. But if she generally
shows respect for human life, and it can be assumed that she would later
refine her plan to blow up the stadium when people are not in it, then her
culpability should be low, as it would be if she intended only to cause
property damage. What if there is no way to tell how she would develop
the intention? One way that might be true is if the prosecution has no
knowledge of her character and larger motives. If that is the situation, the
case should probably be dropped because there will be too little evidence to
assert that she sincerely intended anything. The other way it may be
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impossible to know her intention is if the prosecutor is aware of competing
factors that might well be in equipoise to the actor who had not yet sorted
them out herself. In that case, splitting the difference between the high and
low levels of culpability seems a reasonable solution, one somewhat akin to
prosecuting someone for actions with reckless indifference to human
welfare.
It is worth pointing out that this problem is one that arises not just for
the crime of stating the intent to unlawfully and violently harm others. It
also applies to attempted crimes and conspiracies in which it is unclear how
certain details would be worked out when the crime is interrupted and the
defendant arrested. Just as this problem has not proven fatal for those
inchoate crimes, so, too, should it not be fatal to the crime of stating one’s
criminal intent.
3. Duration and Renunciation of Intentions
Alexander and Ferzan next argue that the proposition that culpability
attaches to the formation of an intention gets caught on a dilemma having to
do with duration and culpability. 192 On the one hand, one might think that
duration—the length of time an actor holds an intention—is not relevant to
culpability, because culpability attaches when one forms a criminal
intention. This is supported by the idea, argued for above, 193 that
culpability depends on having made the wrongful choice to form the
criminal intention. It is also supported by the thought that the risk to the
potential victim does not depend on how long one has formed an intention,
as long as one has sufficient time to act on it.
On the other hand, this position seems to lead to implausible
conclusions at the extremes. Alexander and Ferzan imagine a case in which
Hank has decided on January 1 of one year to kill Sally on January 1 of the
next year. Six months later, Harry forms the same intention to kill Sally on
the next January 1. Suppose that Harry “revokes his intention after thirty
seconds, whereas Hank has held his intention firmly for more than six
months [and then revokes it].” 194 The implication of the supposition is
clearly that duration must matter, that Harry cannot be as culpable as Hank.
And then, to push the point further, they suppose that Harry vacillates
between forming the intention and then revoking it. Each choice to form it
must be a new culpable choice, making him guilty of many culpable acts, in
contrast to Hank’s one culpable act. This, they note, is implausible: “it
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Id. at 206–08.
See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text.
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 138, at 207.
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seems odd to deem indecisive Harry more culpable and deserving of more
punishment than steadfast Hank.” 195
I think the right reply to this purported dilemma is as follows. First,
with regard to the second problem, that of vacillation, note that for each
completed crime that one might intend to perform, there can be only one
intention to perform it (with many variations regarding how to perform it).
Hank may form it and hold onto it, and Harry may form it, drop it, accept it
again, and so on. But what Harry is doing is vacillating with regard to a
single intention. He does not commit a second culpable act when he
accepts it again; he reenters the stream of his earlier culpability, losing
whatever benefit may have come to him from renunciation. With regard to
the first problem, it seems problematic only because thirty seconds is so
brief that one doubts that Harry sincerely held the intention. Even if Harry
changed his mind because of new information about Sally, we think that
one has to live with an intention for a while before one can say that it is
firmly held. It is hard to say just how long such a while is, but if we move
from seconds to weeks, then it is not so counter-intuitive to say that Hank
and Harry are equally culpable if Hank has had the intention to kill Sally for
six months and Harry for two weeks. Of course, if one acts on an intention
right away, and completes the crime, then one is no longer in a position to
renounce one’s intention. 196 But if one has not acted on it, or has only
started to act on it, then one can continue to ponder whether one really
sincerely embraces it. And it normally takes some time before such
pondering can result in a conclusion that is settled and firm.
4. Revocability
Finally, Alexander and Ferzan argue that it does not make sense to
hold people culpable for forming criminal intentions, because until they
perform the final act necessary to cause harm, they can and should revoke
their intentions, and would be non-culpable, at least in certain

195

Id.
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defense.
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jurisdictions, 197 if they did revoke their intentions—something which is not
true of any other completed crime that one tries to “undo.”198 Their
argument seems to be: (a) that once an actor revokes his criminal intention,
he should not be culpable and (b) that the only reason to think otherwise is
the false belief that by forming a criminal intention, he imposes a risk on his
potential victims that he will carry it out. They do not argue in support of
the first part of this argument, but they do argue in support of the second. It
is a false belief, they say, because forming a criminal intention is not like
“lighting . . . a long fuse.” 199 The latter necessarily raises the risk to
potential victims because the actor might not be able to cut the fuse before it
reaches the dynamite. The former is different because a rational actor
always has the capacity to change his mind about an intention and always
has reason—the reason that explains why harming another is wrong in the
first place—to do so.
The problems with their argument are multiple. One can reject both
(a) and (b), and the substantive position that there is something inherently
suspect about having a defense that allows people to undo only certain
crimes. I start with (b). Alexander and Ferzan overlook the idea that one
might reject the defense of abandonment or revocation, not because one
thinks that when a person adopts a criminal intention he raises the odds of
causing the ultimate harm, but rather because one thinks that when a person
adopts a criminal intention, he has wrongly chosen to flout the law. 200 If
one holds that view, then one can take one of two positions on (a): either
revocation should exists as an anomalous complete defense, or it should not
be a complete defense at all. I personally think both positions are plausible.
But it is sufficient for my purposes here to show that at least one of them is
plausible. Accordingly, I finish this subpart by defending the idea that
abandonment of a criminal intention should not be a complete defense to a
crime, but rather should function analogously with the partial defense
available to someone who has performed the last act, and then tried to undo
or prevent the harm he has unleashed. That is, it should limit one’s
culpability, but it should not altogether erase it.
197
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How can abandonment or renunciation even limit one’s culpability if
one’s culpability is established by having formed a sincere and firm
intention to commit a criminal act? The answer is that at various crucial
junctures, when one acts on the criminal intention, one’s culpability grows
because one has shown a firm commitment to committing the crime in the
face of more concrete reasons to abandon the intention. Thus, one’s
culpability increases as one moves from mere intention formation, to
starting to prepare, to commencing the commitment of the crime itself, to
completing the last act needed to perform to complete the crime. At every
step along the way, one can renounce the criminal intention. If one
renounces out of principle, one has done something punishment seeks to
cause one to do, which is to recognize the error of one’s intention. That
should limit one’s culpability, and perhaps even earn one some
forgiveness. 201
In other words, there is a coherent view according to which culpability
can grow, not merely due to the passage of time during which one holds a
criminal intention, but due to actions taken to bring the intention to fruition.
This alternative view fits perfectly well with the commonly shared intuition
that renunciation of a criminal intention can limit or reduce culpability, and
that going further and further towards the completed crime can raise
culpability. And it also fits the view that culpability starts to set in when
one has sincerely formed a criminal intention—the act requirement being
necessary as an evidentiary matter, but not as a fundamental moral matter.
Finally, it is worth pointing out again, as I did after their second
argument, that this fourth argument applies equally against attempt law, at
least the kind the follows the Model Penal Code’s suggestion that
culpability attaches after one has taken a substantial step towards
completion of the crime. For Alexander and Ferzan, that, too, cannot be
defended in the face of the possibility of renunciation. 202 But I would turn
that around on them and say that just as one can be culpable for an
attempted crime after taking a substantial step towards completing it—
despite the fact that one could still change one’s mind—so can one be
culpable for forming the intention to commit a violent crime, and
announcing it to others, despite the fact that one could still change one’s
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mind. 203 Particularly when dealing with the threat to commit terrorist acts,
with their potentially devastating results, there is good reason to want the
criminal law to step in and prevent the act from occurring as soon as a
culpable act based on that intention has been performed—that is, as soon as
the person has sincerely stated the intention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The autonomy respecting model of detention implies that those who
are functionally autonomous adult citizens of a country may not be
preventively detained for a long time, so long as the state’s normal policing
powers are operative. This conclusion may seem hard to stomach when it
comes to certain hard cases: people who announce that they are bent on
committing terrorist acts. What society can let such people free among
them? But it may seem that there are no good alternatives. If these people
cannot be prosecuted for crimes such as conspiring or attempting to commit
terrorist acts (or ancillary crimes), then they must be either preventively
detained or released and policed. The first of these options is indefensible
in a liberal society; and the latter seems to provide inadequate security. I
have argued here, however, that the law of threatening allows for a third
option. They can be prosecuted for the ultimate inchoate crime: stating the
intention to commit unlawful, violent acts.
This is not legally controversial, but it is nonetheless philosophically
problematic. The doctrine concerning threat law is a mess, and has failed to
clearly distinguish the crime that concerns causing fear and disruption from
the crime that concerns stating that one has the intention to commit a
particular violent crime. But the distinction can be made and defended.
Forming the intention to commit a criminal act is the essence of inchoate
crimes. And while the crime of stating the intention to commit unlawful,
violent acts pushes the outer limits of the idea of an inchoate crime, it does
not surpass those limits. As long as the crime itself is sufficiently serious,
and the prospects for deterrence sufficiently low, there is reason to have
such a crime. Further, those conditions are met when dealing with
politically or religiously motivated terrorist crime.
To make use of the crime of stating one’s intention to commit a
terrorist act, the state would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the person was expressing a real intention, a true threat of the non203

Indeed, the reverse leads to a perverse conclusion, which I have noted before. Walen,
supra note 145, at 375 n.6 (arguing that the failure to recognize the culpability of an
attempted crime that does not reach the last required act means that someone who chases
someone else through a crowd trying to shoot him but never getting a clear shot is no more
guilty of a crime than someone who runs through a crowd with a toy gun trying to scare
others as a stupid practical joke).

854

ALEC WALEN

[Vol. 101

paradigmatic sort, rather than demonstrating his bravado, expressing his
fantasies, or venting his rage. That would not be an easy case to make. But
given evidence about what was said, how it was said, character, motive, and
context, it should be possible. And note, the same challenge would
confront military authorities trying to decide whether to continue to detain a
particular detainee who expressed his desire to commit terrorist acts, as
some detainees at Guantanamo have done. 204 The burden of proof is higher
for a criminal case, but that is as it should be. The state should not be in the
business of detaining its own autonomous citizens simply because it thinks
they are dangerous, as long as the state’s normal policing capacity is intact.
It should subject them to long-term detention only if it can convict them of
a serious crime. The crime of stating the intention to commit terrorist acts is
just that.
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See supra note 25 (discussing the case of Abdallah al-Ajmi).

